State User Fees and the Dormant Commerce Clause by Coenen, Dan T.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 50 Issue 4 Article 1 
5-1997 
State User Fees and the Dormant Commerce Clause 
Dan T. Coenen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dan T. Coenen, State User Fees and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 Vanderbilt Law Review 795 
(2019) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol50/iss4/1 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 50 MAY 1997 NUMBER 4
State User Fees and the Dormant
Commerce Clause
Dan T. Coenen*
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 796
II. THE USER-FEE/MARKET-PARTICIPANT ISSUE ..................... 797
III. THE MESSAGE OF OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS ...................... 803
IV. THE ROOTS OF THE USER-FEE/MARKET-PARTICIPANT
PROBLEM .............................................................................. 805
V. RECONCILING THE COURT'S USER-FEE AND
MARKET-PARTICIPANT DECISIONS ...................................... 812
A The Case Against a User-Fee Exception to
the Market-Participant Rule .................. 812
B. The Channels-of-Commerce Reconciliation of the
User-Fee and Market-Participant Cases ................ 816
1. The Court's Decisions .................................. 816
a. The Wharfage Cases ......................... 816
b. The Road Cases ................................ 818
c. The Airport Cases ............................ 820
d. Pulling Together the User-Fee
Decisions ........................................... 822
2. The Purposes of the Commerce Clause ...... 823
a. The Pro-Transportation Purpose of
the Commerce Clause ....................... 823
b. The Anti-Tariff Purpose of the
Commerce Clause ............................. 824
3. Commerce Clause Policy ............................. 826
* J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law; B.S. 1974,
University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1978, Cornell University. The Author thanks Walter Hellerstein
for useful comments on a draft of this Article and Vickie Miller, Jacob Maurer and Leigh Martin
for valuable cite-checking and research assistance.
795
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
4. The Modern Regulatory Transportation
Cases ........................................................... 829
5. A Possible Limit on the Transportation-
User-Fee Anti-Discrimination Rule ........... 830
6. Sum m ary .................................................... 834
C. Merging the Market-Participant and User-Fee
Principles ............................................................... 835
1. Constitutional Limits on Discriminatory
"User Fees" Outside the Channels-of-
Commerce Context ..................................... 835
2. A Proposed Step-by-Step Approach ........... 840
VI. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 842
I. INTRODUCTION
The law takes shape as great principles collide in the context
of concrete cases. In the field of constitutional law, the task of
reconciling key precepts falls, of necessity, to the Supreme Court.
Indeed, much of the Court's work involves delineating the borders of
competing constitutional principles that the Court itself has created.1
This Article considers the interplay of two central tenets of the
Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence.2 The first of these
principles exempts from the general proscription on discrimination
against interstate commerce a state's actions as a "market par-
ticipant," rather than as a "market regulator."' The second principle,
in contrast, renders the nondiscrimination rule fully applicable to the
imposition of state "user fees."4
Part II of this Article shows why these doctrinal pronounce-
ments stand in an unsteady tension. It also explains how this tension
revealed itself in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Quality of Oregon,5 when two dissenters attacked the
majority for overriding the market-participant exception by outlawing
state discrimination in fixing public-landfill fees.6 Part III explains
1. See, for example, Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Burger Court
414 (Oxford U., 1988) CThe difficult constitutional cases are ... those in which conflicting
rights--each by itself deserving of judicial protection-are at issue. The courts must
then... define the precise course and texture of the interface between the competing rights.").
2. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 116 S. Ct. 848, 854, 133 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1996).
3. See notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
4. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
5. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
6. Id. at 109, 114-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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why the dissenters' reading of Oregon Waste Systems was misguided.
Although that decision pointed up the long-latent strain between the
Court's market-participant and user-fee cases, it did not resolve-in
the public landfill context or otherwise-the ostensible contradiction
created by these competing bodies of law.
Part IV explains how this doctrinal conflict could emerge. For
years the Court has treated state tax cases and state regulation cases
as falling into distinct analytical categories for dormant commerce
clause purposes. Part IV shows how the creation of this doctrinal
dichotomy may have led the Court to gloss over the intrinsic incom-
patibility of its broadly stated market-participant and user-fee rules.
Finally, Part V offers what the Supreme Court has not yet
provided: a synthesis of these clashing principles that comports with
both existing caselaw and sound dormant commerce clause poicy.
Close inspection reveals that, although the Court has declared the
user-fee anti-discrimination rule in categorical terms, it actually has
applied that rule only to state charges associated with roads, airports,
and other channels of interstate movement. These decisions are cor-
rect, according to the synthesis proposed in this Article, because of the
compelling need to safeguard access to the essential avenues of inter-
state trade. This channels-of-commerce principle, however, does not
dictate that states must make public landfills-as well as many other
government facilities unconnected with interstate move-
ment-available to in-state and out-of-state users on equal terms.
Rather, states may impose discriminatory fees for the use of such
facilities because such charges are constitutional under the market-
participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.
II. THE USER-FEE/MARKET-PARTICIPANT ISSUE
For more than a century, the Supreme Court has read the
Commerce Clause to mean that the states must "sink or swim to-
gether"'7 as parts of a "federal free trade unit."8 In keeping with this
"dormant" or "negative" component of the Commerce Clause, the
Court has proclaimed that a state's "differential treatment of in-state
and out-of-state economic interests.., is virtually per se invalid" even
7. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
8. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949).
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in the absence of preemptive federal legislation.9 Under this rule, for
example, a state may not inhibit sales by traveling representatives of
nonresident firms to give a competitive edge to local retailers.1
Likewise, a state may not impose a greater tax on nonresident buyers
of private landfill services than it imposes on similarly situated
residents."
This "principle of nondiscrimination,"12 however, is subject to
an important exception. The Court has declined to apply it when a
state discriminates against interstate commerce in distributing its
own resources.'3 In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corporation,14 for
example, the Court considered a law under which Maryland paid cash
bounties for the disposal of Maryland-titled junk cars. 5 The problem
was that Maryland in effect made its bounties more readily available
to in-state than to out-of-state processors. 6  Despite this
discrimination, the Court upheld the program. The Court reasoned
that Maryland had not burdened nonresident traders through a
discriminatory exercise of its regulatory or taxing powers. Rather, the
state had entered "the market as a purchaser," utilizing its own
resources to favor in-state industry. 7
Alexandria Scrap provided the doctrinal springboard for judi-
cial recognition of the "market-participant exception" to the dormant
9. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 99.
10. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
11. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Nat'l Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 367-
68 (1992).
12. Id. at 360 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978)).
13. For discussions of the Courts key decisions--and their soundness and
implications--see, for example, Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-11
(Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988); Thomas K. Anson and P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the
Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 71 (1980); Dan T.
Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88
Mich. L. Rev. 395 (1989); Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 43, 98-109 (1988); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 Tex. L.
Rev. 1097 (1988); Paul S. Kline, Publicly-Owned Landfills and Local Preferences: A Study of the
Market Participant Doctrine, 96 Dickinson L. Rev. 331 (1992); Karl Manheim, New-Age
Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22 Ariz. St. L. J. 559 (1990); Michael J. Polelle,
A Critique of the Market Participation Exception, 15 Whittier L. Rev. 647 (1994); David Pomper,
Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause,
Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1309 (1989);
Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091 (1986); Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizenship" and
Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487 (1981); Michael Wells and Walter Hellerstein, The
Governmental-Proprietary Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 Va. L. Rev. 1073 (1980).
14. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
15. Id. at 797.
16. Id. at 802.
17. Id. at 808.
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Commerce Clause. 8 Invoking this exception, the Court has held that
no violation of the Commerce Clause occurs when states prefer
residents over nonresidents in hiring workers, 19 selling goods, 20 or
purchasing services for governmental use. 21 In none of these cases,
however, has the Court squarely considered the constitutional status
of one common form of state "marketplace" activity: the charging of
fees to secure compensation for government services or assets. Even
so, the Court's oft-expressed willingness to protect states as market
participants has led observers to find that the fixing of state fees
enjoys immunity from commerce clause attack. Lower courts have
reached this conclusion, 22 and leading commentators have declared
without hesitation that "[t]he selling of state-owned resources to local
residents at a lower price [than] the state charges to out of state
interests is consistent with commerce clause principles because the
state is acting as a 'market-participant.' "23
The problem with this seemingly straightforward application
of the market-participant principle is that it clashes with another
tenet of the Court's dormant commerce clause jurisprudence-namely,
that a state "user fee" is unconstitutional if it "discriminates against
interstate commerce."24 In Guy v. Baltimore,25 for example, the Court
considered a fee charged for use of a city-owned wharf by vessels that
carried only out-of-state goods. Essentially anticipating the modern
market-participant doctrine, the city argued that this fee structure
should escape dormant commerce clause scrutiny because of the city's
proprietary interest in its docks.26 The Court, however, rejected this
18. See generally sources cited in note 13.
19. White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 205-06
(1983).
20. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980).
21. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 725 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (three-judge
panel), affd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972). Following the Courts formal articulation of the market-
participant doctrine, it reiterated its American Yearbook ruling in the Reeves decision. Reeves,
447 U.S. at 437 n.9; id. at 450 (Powell, J., dissenting).
22. See note 99 and accompanying text (collecting cases). See also Atlantic Coast
Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 48 F.3d 701, 717 (3d Cir. 1995)
('When a public entity participates in a market, it may sell and buy what it chooses, to or from
whom it chooses, on terms of its choice... ").
23. John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 8.9 at 307 (West, 5th ed.
1995).
24. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707, 717 (1972).
25. 100 U.S. 434 (1879).
26. See Collins, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 108 n.392 (cited in note 13) (noting that in Guy "Chief
Justice Waite dissented on grounds that sound like market participant immunity").
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argument on its way to invalidating the discriminatory fee.27
Following the lead of Guy, later cases have repeatedly insisted that
"[a] user fee is valid only to the extent it 'does not discriminate
against interstate commerce.'"28 The Court, moreover, has not
confined this principle by narrowly defining the term "user fee."
Instead, it has suggested that this term broadly embraces any
"specific charge imposed by the State for the use of state-owned or
state-provided transportation or other facilities and services."29 In
short, the Court's user-fee cases suggest that discrimination against
interstate commerce is barred with respect to all state charges im-
posed for the enjoyment of any state-supplied services or property.
The Court's user-fee and market-participant decisions do
not-to say the least-stand comfortably together. The "market par-
ticipant" label would seem to fit easily, after all, when a state disposes
of property or services for a price. 30 No less significantly, the market-
participant exception reflects the underlying policy notion that state
claims to autonomy are strongest when the state transfers resources
that are the state's own.3' Yet precisely the same policy operates
when a state fixes user fees, for such fees by definition are charged for
the use of "facilities and services" provided by the state itself.3 2
The Court has yet to face up to the seeming contradiction that
marks its market-participant and user-fee decisions. This doctrinal
strain, however, lurked just beneath the surface in the Court's recent
Oregon Waste Systems decision.33 The issue in that case was whether
Oregon could impose a higher in-state-disposal "surcharge" on waste
27. See notes 75-77, 111-17 and accompanying text.
28. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 104 n.6 (quoting Northwest Airlines v. Kent
County, 510 U.S. 355, 369 (1994)).
29. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 621 (1981) (emphasis added).
See id. at 622 n.12 (distinguishing user fees from taxes). See also note 101 (quoting user-fee
definition set forth in Oregon Waste Systems). Compare Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools,
487 U.S. 450, 458 (1988) (considering the constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause of
a "user fee for bus service").
30. See, for example, Collins, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 106 (cited in note 13) (CWhen states im-
pose charges.., for state services or for use of state property, their actions are often literally
those of market participants.").
31. See Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 422 (cited in note 13) ("[1It is useful to recall that
states are people-people who have banded together. One collective activity in which a state's
citizens may engage is the accumulation of property.... [It seems sensible that when a state
government distributes state resources, it may-on behalf of all its citizens-pick and choose
among proper recipients."); Varat, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 523 (cited in note 13) ("Like other
groups free to combine their members' efforts to produce collective benefits to be shared among
the group, political communities, including states, have a prima facie justification for limiting
distribution of their public goods to those who combined to provide them.").
32. Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 621.
33. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 93.
800 [Vol. 50:795
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generated outside Oregon's borders than on waste generated inside
the state.34 In litigating this question, Oregon sought to characterize
its surcharge as a "user fee," rather than a "tax."35 Writing for a
seven-member majority, however, Justice Thomas rejected in a foot-
note the state's effort to take advantage of the "user fee" moniker. As
he explained, user fees are "charge[s] imposed by the State for the use
of state-owned or state-provided... facilities... ... 36 In Oregon Waste
Systems, however, it was "undisputed that.., the landfials in ques-
tion are owned by private entities. . . ,, 3 It thus followed easily that,
whatever else the Oregon surcharge might be, it was not a "user
fee."38 Justice Thomas, however, did not stop here. In a single sen-
tence (which inspires much that follows), he added the following ob-
servation: "Nevertheless, even if the surcharge could somehow be
viewed as a user fee, it could not be sustained as such, given that it
discriminates against interstate commerce."39
These twenty-seven words-though seemingly supported by
more than a century of Supreme Court jurisprudence 40-- drew a sting-
ing rebuke from Chief Justice Rehnquist. Pointing to the passage, the
Chief Justice chided the majority for its "dubious assertion.."41 "[I]f
the State owned and operated a park or recreational facility," the
Chief Justice observed, "it would be allowed to charge differential fees
for in-state and out-of-state users of the resource.."42 The Chief Justice
also noted that, while past decisions had blocked state discrimination
against nonresident users of private landfills, those same decisions
had distinguished cases that involved "disposal of out-of-state solid
34. Id. at 95.
35. Respondents Brief at 9, 11, 13, 40, Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Env.
Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (Nos. 93-70, 93-108). In particular, the state sought to
invoke the "compensatory fee" label, so as to sidestep the effect of the Court's earlier and strict
"compensatory taie' decisions. See note 230. Oregon's theory was that it could impose a higher
fee on out-of-state landfill users so long as that fee did not exceed Oregon's reasonable costs in
supervising, and otherwise dealing with, the in-state handling of out-of-state waste. Oregon
Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 96. See generally Steve Yarborough, Casenote, Compensatory Fee or
Protectionist Tax: Oregon's Surcharge on Out-of-State Waste, 34 Nat. Resources J. 497, 502-03,
514 (1994) (seeking to distinguish Oregon's surcharge from compensatory tax). Interestingly,
the Court had rejected much the same argument for upholding a discriminatory fee more than a
century earlier in the Guy case. See notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
36. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 103 n.6 (quoting Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S.
at 621).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 103-04 n.6.
40. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
41. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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waste at landfills owned by the government. ... 43 The Chief Justice's
point was clear. In his view, if a state-owned park could raise charges
for nonresidents and a state-owned landfill could exclude nonresi-
dents altogether, then a state-owned landfill surely could deal with
nonresidents but charge them higher user fees. The Chief Justice
thus condemned the majority's "sweeping ruling" because it made "no
distinction between publicly and privately owned landfills."44
This exchange between Justice Thomas and Chief Justice
Rehnquist points up a long-dormant difficulty in the Court's dormant
commerce clause caselaw. What is the answer to the question
whether a state-owned landfill can charge nonresident users higher
fees than it charges its own residents? And what about state dis-
crimination in fixing charges for public colleges and hospitals, agricul-
tural extension services, toll roads, campsites, resort cabins, and the
myriad other discrete and tangible benefits state governments may
sell for a price. With respect to these questions, the Court's "states
can't discriminate" user-fee cases seem set on a collision course with
its "states can discriminate" market-participant cases.
43. Id. (emphasis added) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See note 45.
44. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Although the
point is peripheral to the main subject of this Article, the reasoning that underpins the Chief
Justice's attack is subject to criticism on at least two grounds. First, the Chief Justice cited only
Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), in support of his assertion
that states can price-discriminate in fixing charges for park use free from commerce clause
constraints. In Baldwin, however, the Court confronted and rejected only a Privileges and
Immunities Clause attack, and did so only with respect to discriminatory hunting license-as
opposed to state park-fees. Id. at 378-88. The Court, however, has made it clear that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause and dormant Commerce Clause are not coextensive. United
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor and Council, 465 U.S. 208, 219-20 (1984). See also
note 57 (noting difference in clauses' treatment of corporations). Second, after citing Baldwin
for the compatibility of the Commerce Clause and discriminatory park fees, the Chief Justice
added: "More recently we upheld such differential fees under a reasonableness standard in
[Northwest Airlines]...." Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
In fact, the Court did no such thing because Northwest Airlines did not involve "differentiar fees
at all. Rather, the question in Northwest Airlines was whether a user-fee scheme-under which
a public authority charged "commercial airlines" 100% of the costs generated by their use of
airport runways, while charging "general aviation" users 20% of costs allocated to them-should
be found to discriminate between interstate and intrastate commerce. Northwest Airlines, 510
U.S. at 359-60. Rejecting the argument (on the facts presented) that "general aviation is
properly categorized as intrastate commerce," the Court refused to find any discrimination
against interstate commerce in the case. Id. at 372. Indeed, the underlying premise of the
Court in Northwest Airlines was that the user fee would be unconstitutional if, in fact, it
discriminated against interstate commerce. In these circumstances, the suggestion by the Chief
Justice that Northwest Airlines authorizes state price discrimination against persons engaged in
interstate activity was off the mark.
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III. THE MESSAGE OF OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Oregon Waste
Systems did more than merely highlight the tension between the
Court's market-participant and user-fee caselaw; it also denounced
the majority for overriding the market-participant rule with the user-
fee anti-discrimination principle when a state fixes charges for public
landfill use. If the Chief Justice's reading of the majority opinion is
right, Oregon Waste Systems itself goes far toward setting the bound-
ary between the Court's market-participant and user-fee rules. Thus,
the first question presented by any inquiry into this subject is
whether-as Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested-the majority opinion
in Oregon Waste Systems dictates that a state must charge
nonresidents the same public-landfill fees it charges its own
residents. For three separate reasons, the answer is "no."
First, the majority's one-sentence treatment of discriminatory
user fees in its footnote six was just that-one sentence in a footnote.
In that sentence, the Court did not recognize the tension between its
user-fee and market-participant cases; it did not discuss that tension;
and it did not profess to reconcile any conflict between these contest-
ing lines of authority. Indeed, in footnote nine of its opinion, the
majority observed that it had "no occasion to decide whether Oregon
could validly accomplish its limited cost spreading through the
'market participant' doctrine... 
."45 Particularly in light of this ex-
plicit disclaimer, it would be wrong to read footnote six as setting
forth a major and controversial pronouncement about how the mar-
ket-participant rule operates in public-landfill and other user-fee
cases.46
45. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 106 n.9. The Court had made the same point in
earlier landfill cases. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, 504 U.S. at 358-59 'Nor does the case
raise any question concerning policies that municipalities or other governmental agencies may
pursue in the management of publicly owned facilities."); id. at 366 n.7 (distinguishing earlier
decision on ground that "private landfills ... are neither publicly produced nor publicly owned");
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627 n.6 ("We express no opinion about New Jersey's power, consistent
with the Commerce Clause, to restrict to state residents access to state-owned resources... f).
46. See Atlantic Coast Demolition & Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of
Atlantic County, 48 F.3d 701, 716 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing footnote nine of Oregon Waste Systems
as indicating that "the Court has.., left unanswered the question as to what effect government
ownership of a waste facility would have on otherwise discriminatory waste measures"). See
also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S. 377, 387 n.5 (1992) ("It is of course contrary
to all traditions of our jurisprudence to consider the law on this point conclusively resolved by
broad language in cases where the issue was not presented or even envisioned").
1997]
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Second, whatever the majority meant to say in the final sen-
tence of footnote six, that sentence was unnecessary to the Court's
decision in the case. The Court already had rejected Oregon's effort to
characterize its surcharge as a user fee in the footnote's immediately
preceding passages. 47 As a result, the Court's one-sentence invocation
of the user-fee anti-discrimination principle, whatever its intended
meaning, constituted at most the briefest dictum, which provides no
proper embodiment of a seminal constitutional ruling.8
Third, and most important, the sentence that concludes foot-
note six is susceptible of a reading that says nothing whatsoever
about the market-participant doctrine. That sentence states only that
the user-fee anti-discrimination principle would control "if the sur-
charge could somehow be viewed as a user fee."49 The sentence thus
focuses on "the surcharge"-that is, the surcharge that Oregon actu-
ally imposed. Because this charge concerned only waste placed in
private landfills,5 the sentence is not a statement about a hypotheti-
cal fee charged for public landfill use, as the Chief Justice apparently
assumed. In other words, the more plausible reading of Justice
Thomas's critical sentence is that if the actual charge placed by
Oregon on private landfill use were somehow characterized as a user
fee, such a user fee would not pass constitutional muster. On this
reading, however, the Court in Oregon Waste Systems made no state-
ment about the scope of the market-participant rule, since that rule
could and would concern only charges for access to public landfills.51
In short, Chief Justice Rehnquist's suggestion that the sentence set
forth a "sweeping ruling" that controls charges for both "publicly and
privately owned landfills" 52 greatly overstated what the majority had
done.
47. See notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
48. See, for example, Third National Bank in Nashville v. Impac Limited, Inc., 432 U.S.
312, 319 n.9 (1977) ('[D]ictum is... not controlling [when] 'the very point is presented for
decision."' (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheaton) 264, 399 (1821))); Permian Basin
Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 775 (1968) ("[Tlhis Court does not decide important questions of
law by cursory dicta inserted in unrelated cases.").
49. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 104 n.6.
50. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
51. See notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
52. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 50:795804
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IV. THE ROOTS OF THE USER-FEEMARKET-PARTICIPANT PROBLEM
The fact that Oregon Waste Systems failed to resolve the ten-
sion between the Court's user-fee and market-participant decisions
does not mean that the tension does not exist. Nor does it mean that
the Court's opinion in Oregon Waste Systems will play no role as
judges identify and struggle with this problem. Lower courts surely
will notice, for example, that Oregon Waste Systems, in describing the
Court's nearly contemporaneous decision in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Kent County,53 set forth the user-fee nondiscrimination principle in
stark and sweeping terms." Northwest Airlines, in turn, relied on
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority v. Delta Airlines,55 in which
the Court, in upholding a user fee, deemed it critical that the fee was
not "discriminatory against interstate commerce. 56 Read for all they
are worth, these broad condemnations of discriminatory user fees
raise doubts about far more than the landfill fees of immediate inter-
est to Chief Justice Rehnquist. They also place in constitutional jeop-
ardy differential charges for such activities as catching state fish,57
53. 510 U.S. 355 (1994).
54. See note 28 and accompanying text.
55. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
56. Id. at 717. The unqualified breadth of the Court's past pronouncements in its user-fee
cases is suggested by the appellants' brief in a pre.Oregon Waste Systems case. As the appellant
in that case stated: "The decisions of this Court have long established that the Commerce
Clause prohibits state taxes that expressly favor in-state over out-of-state commerce. The same
standard of nondiscrimination is applicable to state ... fees for the use of public facilities."
Appellanes Brief at 16, American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) (No. 86-
357) (citations omitted). See generally notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
57. As already pointed out, the Coures prior decisions do not conclusively establish the
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of discriminatory hunting and fishing license fees under
the dormant Commerce Clause and the market-participant exception. See note 44. Perhaps the
Court will find the Commerce Clause wholly inapplicable in some or all of these cases. For
example, the Court-in reliance on textual explicitness-might conclude that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause provides the exclusive basis for challenging all state laws that overtly dis-
criminate between individual residents and nonresidents, including those laws that concern
recreational hunting and fishing fees. See Carlson v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry
Comm'n, 919 P.2d 1337, 1340-41 (Alaska 1996). If the Court did find such laws subject to only
Privileges and Immunities Clause challenge, it presumably would uphold them on the ground
that they do not infringe "fundamental" interests. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388 (holding that
elk-hunting license fee discrimination against nonresidents did not offend the Privileges and
Immunities Clause because elk hunting is not a fundamental right).
The Court, however, has not previously viewed the Privileges and Immunities Clause as
automatically displacing the operation of the dormant Commerce Clause in all cases involving
discrimination between resident and nonresident individuals. See, for example, White, 460 U.S.
at 206-15 (evaluating state discrimination between resident and nonresident workers under the
dormant Commerce Clause, but applying the market-participant exception). See also Edwards
v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1941) (striking down a prohibition on bringing indigent
nonresidents into a state on commerce clause grounds); W.C.M. Window Co. Inc v. Bernardi, 730
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camping in state parks,58 purchasing state products and services, 59
and obtaining a public college education. 60
F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the view, in hiring preference case, that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause "preempts" commerce clause review); Gulch Gaming Inc v. State of South
Dakota, 781 F. Supp. 621 (D.S.D. 1991) (invalidating state statute limiting non-resident
investors in gambling operations under the Commerce Clause). More significantly for present
purposes, the adoption of such an approach would hardly make discriminatory user-fee
questions under the Commerce Clause disappear. Such an approach, for example, would not
speak to a state's imposition of higher fees on foreign corporations for commercial fishing
licenses because the Privileges and Immunities Clause is wholly inapplicable to corporations.
See, for example, Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wallace) 168, 180-82 (1868). Nor would it deal
with state discrimination between individuals in fixing fees based not on residence itself, but on
the locus of some commercial activity-such as where the individual engages in most of his or
her productive work. See Pawa v. McDonald, 921 F. Supp. 227 (D. Vt. 1996) (discrimination
based on where individual's car is registered).
The Court also might sidestep application of the dormant Commerce Clause to recreational
hunting or fishing fee differentials on the theory that hunting and fishing does not involve
"commerce" within the meaning of the Clause. See Terk v. Ruch, 655 F. Supp. 205, 215 (D. Colo.
1987) (holding that unharvested game is not an "article[ ] of commerce"); Shepherd v. State Dep't
of Fish and Game, 897 P.2d 33, 42 (Alaska 1995) (same); Clajon Production Corp. v. Petera, 854
F. Supp. 843, 860 n.323 (D. Wyo. 1994) (same), affd, 70 F.3d 1566, 1571 n.11 (10th Cir. 1995)
(finding no standing to assert commerce clause claim but also noting that plaintiffs have a
"legally protected interest under the Commerce Clause"). See also LCM Enterprises v. Town of
Dartmouth, 14 F.3d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that district court found no standing for
plaintiffs to challenge town's discriminatory boat-mooring fee under the Commerce Clause
"because they used their boats only for recreational purposes and did not engage in any
commercial activity that would be affected by the use fee" but also noting that the commerce
clause issue was not raised on appeal). Compare Lopez v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L.
Ed. 2d 626 (1995) (possession of gun near a school does not involve "economic activity" subject to
regulation pursuant to Congress's commerce power). Indeed, the holdings of some courts
suggest that state discrimination in fixing fees for even commercial fishing licenses is immune
from commerce clause attack on this ground. See, for example, Tangier Sound Watermen's
Ass'n v. Douglas, 541 F. Supp. 1287, 1306 (E.D. Va. 1982) ("IT]he Court is not convinced that the
Commerce [C]lause reaches a State law whose effect is to prohibit a nonresident commercial
crabber from catching crabs in Virginia. Plaintiffs have not established that unharvested crabs
are articles of commerce."). Some hoary cases lend support to this position. See, for example,
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396 (1876). More recent decisions, however, cast doubt upon
it. See Carlson v. State, 798 P.2d 1269, 1277 n.4 (Alaska 1990) (discussing Supreme Court
cases). See also Davrod Corp. v. Coates, 971 F.2d 778, 790 (1st Cir. 1992) (upholding state
statute restricting commercial fishing boat length against commerce clause challenge); Atlantic
Prince, Ltd. v. Jorling, 710 F. Supp. 893, 902 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (invalidating state statute
restricting commercial boat length on dormant commerce clause grounds).
58. Perhaps states are prepared to argue that charging nonresidents higher fees for access
to lands-like charging nonresidents higher fees for access to fish or game-does not involve
disposal of an "article of commerce." See note 57. This approach, however, seems counter-
intuitive; most people paying a fee for a campsite would, for example, view themselves as
engaging in a commercial exchange. In addition, most transactions of this sort-for example,
the sale of access rights to a campground or a state park--can readily be characterized as
involving the sale of services, to which the dormant Commerce Clause has been held to extend.
See note 59.
Perhaps an even more troubling implication of defining "commerce" not to reach such
activities as the purchase of access rights to state campsites or parks (and, perhaps, for that
matter, state fish or game) is that such a definition might well free states to exclude nonresi-
dents even from private campground or recreational areas (or fish farms or hunting preserves).
Indeed, such a definition might well preclude Congress from acting affirmatively to bar state
discrimination against nonresidents seeking to use wholly private facilities because "there is no
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'two-tiered definition of commerce.' The definition of 'commerce' is the same when relied on to
strike down or restrict state legislation as when relied on to support some exertion of federal
control or regulation." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 n.2 (1979) (quoting Philadelphia,
437 U.S. at 621-23).
The Court might respond to these difficulties by defining "commerce" to exclude only public
transactions with respect to such activities. Drawing this sort of public/private distinction,
however, would seem inevitably to rest on the same notion of public ownership that underlies
the market-participant exception. See note 31 and accompanying text. Deciding whether to
define "commerce" narrowly in this way would thus provide no escape from the overarching
question addressed in this Article: Whether the state-ownership-driven market-participant
concept should trump the Courts broadly stated user-fee anti-discrimination rule.
59. With respect to state goods, see notes 96-97 and accompanying text. With respect to
state services (for example, in the form of agricultural or small-business consulting services)
states might seek to escape the market-participant/user-fee conundrum by asserting that the
dormant Commerce Clause reaches only "the transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of
commodities." Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 351 (1880) (emphasis added). More recent
decisions, however, leave no doubt that the anti-protectionism principle covers the purchase and
sale of services as well. See, for example, Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27,
39-44 (1980) (invalidating a state law barring out-of-state bank ownership of trust advisory
businesses). Indeed, the proper view of the Coures many recent landfill cases is that they
involve not "'sales' of... waste," Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 340
n.3 (1992), but purchases of "the service of processing and disposing of it," C & A Carbone, Inc.
v. Clarkston, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994).
60. As with game- and park-related fees, see note 57, the Court has never specifically
found that differential public-school tuition charges comport with the dormant Commerce
Clause. There are, however, strong indications that the Court would find no commerce clause
problem if the question were squarely presented. See, for example, Martinez v. Bynum, 461
U.S. 321, 333 (1983) (stating, in applying the Equal Protection Clause, that the "Constitution
permits a State to restrict eligibility for tuition-free education to its bona fide residents");
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 442 (1980) (suggesting concern that the Commerce Clause's preclusion of
discrimination in sales of state-made cement would logically undermine state discrimination in
other areas, including education); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1973) (noting, in an
equal protection case, that "[tihe State can establish such reasonable criteria for in-state status
as to make virtually certain that students who are not, in fact, bona fide residents of the State,
but who have come there solely for educational purposes, cannot take advantage of the in-state
rates"). See also Sturgis v. Washington, 368 F. Supp. 38, 42 (W.D. Wash. 1973) (three-judge
panel) (upholding, against equal protection attack, higher tuition for nonresident students of a
public university), affd mem., 414 U.S. 1057 (1973); Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234, 241
(D. Minn. 1970) (same), affd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971). Moreover, the lower courts have
concluded without difficulty that discriminatory policies in charging tuition pose no dormant
commerce clause problems. See Harris v. Hall, 572 F. Supp. 1054, 1058 (E.D.N.C. 1983)
(invoking Martinez to reject a commerce clause challenge to school district tuition charge
imposed only on nondomiciliaries, including an elementary school student temporarily residing
with grandmother); Landwehr v. Regents of University of Colorado, 396 P.2d 451, 453 (Colo.
1964) (rejecting a challenge to university tuition for nonresidents that is three times larger than
tuition paid by residents, without citation to authority, on ground that there is "no basis
whatever for the contention.., that the statute violates [the Commerce Clause]"). See also
Hawaii Boating Ass'n v. Water Transportation Facilities Division, 651 F.2d 661, 665 (9th Cir.
1981) (suggesting, in rejecting commerce clause challenge to landing-berth boat fees,
permissibility of imposing differential tuition). The problem is that the courts have not
explained why tuition differentials comport with the dormant Commerce Clause and, in
particular, the Court's repeated condemnation of discriminatory user fees. This Article, among
other things, seeks to fill this void.
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In short, as surely as the market-participant cases suggest
that such differential charges are exempt from commerce clause
scrutiny, the Court's user-fee decisions give cause to conclude they are
per se invalid. How can it be that a tension so stark and unsettling
has crept into the Court's dormant commerce clause caselaw? The
answer may lie in the Court's longstanding bifurcation of the dormant
commerce clause world into two separate hemispheres-one occupied
by cases involving state taxes and the other by cases concerning state
regulatory programs. 61
As even the commerce clause neophyte knows, state tax cases
are controlled by the four-part test set forth in Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady.62 Under this test, a state tax survives commerce clause
challenge only if it "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services
provided by the State."63 In contrast, the Court has examined cases
that involve state regulatory measures using a different "'two-tiered'
approach."64 Under this mode of analysis, the court first determines
whether the challenged policy "regulates evenhandedly with only
'incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against
interstate commerce."65 After the court has made this initial charac-
terization choice, it then applies the operative legal test: "If a restric-
tion on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid. By
contrast, nondiscriminatory regulations that have only incidental
effects on interstate commerce are valid unless 'the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.' "66 In short, the Court has treated state taxation and state
regulation as falling into separate analytical categories for purposes
of the dormant Commerce Clause.67
Against this backdrop, it makes sense to view the Court's mar-
ket-participant decisions-which concerned state activities not even
61. See notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
62. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
63. Id. at 279.
64. Ferndale Laboratories, Inc. v. Cavendish, 79 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1996).
65. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336.
66. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 99 (citations omitted) (quoting Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
67. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-15 at 442 n.3 (cited in note 13) C'[T]he
Supreme Court's historically more formalistic approach to tax problems has led to the evolution
of a distinct body of doctrines...."); Polelle, 15 Whittier L. Rev. at 653 (cited in note 13) C'[T]he
Court has adopted and applied a set of factors that operate more like a checklist than a balanc-
ing test. The net result has been an approach that is more likely to sustain a state tax rather
than a state regulation under similar circumstances").
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remotely resembling taxation68-as involving judicial removal of
would-be state "regulation" cases from the otherwise-applicable dor-
mant commerce clause two-step test. The Court's own rhetoric lends
support to this understanding. In Alexandria Scrap, for example, the
Court upheld Maryland's subsidy program because the state "ha[d]
not sought.., to regulate the conditions under which [trade] may oc-
cur."69 Similarly in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,7° the Court parried the dor-
mant commerce clause challenge to a preference for residents in
distributing state-made cement by deeming the state a "market par-
ticipant, rather than.., a market regulator."71 And in White v.
Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc.,72 the Court
reiterated its view that the distinction "between States as market
participants and States as market regulators makes good sense and
sound law."73 As these passages reveal, the market-participant prin-
ciple originated, and has continued to operate, as a means of avoiding
the two-step inquiry normally applicable in commerce clause regula-
tion cases.
In contrast, the Court has tended to group its commerce clause
user-fee and tax cases together, for the understandable reason that
both involve state-imposed monetary exactions. 74 In the Guy case,75
for example, the Court struck down the city's discriminatory dock
charge because the Court deemed it "a mere expedient or device to
accomplish, by indirection, what the State could not accomplish by a
direct tax .... "76 "Such exactions, in the name of wharfage," the
Court explained, "must be regarded as taxation upon inter-state
commerce. 77 The Court again connected up its user-fee and tax cases
in Complete Auto Transit, when it drew upon user-fee precedents in
68. See notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
69. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 806 (emphasis added).
70. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
71. Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
72. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
73. Id. at 207 (quoting Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436) (emphasis added).
74. This is not to say that the Court has consistently treated user fees and taxes
identically for dormant commerce clause purposes. In fact, during the era in which the Court
flatly barred state taxation of interstate commerce, it specifically distinguished user fees, which
in general it found to be permissible. See, for example, St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., 148 U.S. 92, 97 (1893) Chat by [a charge] the city receives something which it may use as
revenue, does not.., make it a tax."). What is noteworthy, however, is that even in this bygone
era the Court recognized the need to treat together and reconcile its commerce clause tax and
user-fee cases. See generally Parts V.B.a-d and accompanying text.
75. Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1879). See notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
76. Guy, 100 U.S. at 443.
77. Id.
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forging the modern four-part test.78 Then, in Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Montana,79 the Court went one step further when it suggested
that user fees were subject to even stricter constitutional scrutiny
than ordinary forms of state taxation.
The issue in Commonwealth Edison was whether a severance
tax for coal-ninety percent of which was shipped outside the
state-violated the Complete Auto Transit requirement that taxes be
"fairly related to the services provided by the state."80 Relying on past
user-fee decisions, the challenger argued that the assessment ran
afoul of the fairly-related requirement because annual proceeds from
the severance tax represented about one hundred times the annual
cost to the state for roads, police, schools, and other public services
generated by in-state coal mining.81 In the Court's eyes, however, the
challengers "completely misunderstood the nature of the inquiry
under the fourth prong,"8 2 which was satisfied by the simple fact that
the tax was assessed in proportion to the amount of coal extracted
from the earth.83 In adopting this refinement of the Complete Auto
Transit test, the Court distinguished earlier user-fee cases, in which
it had required a tight fit between the amount of the fee charged and
the value of the services provided by the state. The Court explained
that " 'user' charges 'are not true revenue measures' 84 or "a tax, as
that term is thought of in a technical sense."8 5 Rather, user fees
"'partak[e] ... of the nature of a rent charged by the State, based
upon its proprietary interest in its public property.... ,"'86 For these
reasons, the Court-while not retreating from prior decisions
78. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text. The
Court in Complete Auto Transit seemed to draw on its user-fee precedent-particularly in
support of the "unrelated to services provided" prong-when it cited Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290
(1937) and Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939). See Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S.
at 278 n.6. See also notes 119, 125 and accompanying text (discussing Ingels and Clark).
79. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
80. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.
81. Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 620 n.10.
82. Id. at 621.
83. Id. at 626-27. In particular, the Court in Commonwealth Edison broadly rejected the
view that "the Commerce Clause gives residents of one State [such] a right of access at
'reasonable' prices to resources located in another State" that a hefty tax imposed on the sever-
ance of those resources is subject to "reasonableness" attack. Id. at 619. Indeed, the Court even
rejected the "assertion that Montana may not 'exploit' its 'monopoly position by exporting tax
burdens to other States' through imposition of the coal tax. Id. (emphasis added). See also
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245, 259 (1922) (rejecting the view that Pennsylvania's
virtual monopoly on anthracite coal barred it from imposing severance tax, about 80% of which
was applied to coal exported from state).
84. Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 622 n.12 (quoting Paul J. Hartman, State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce 20 n.72 (Dennis, 1953)).
85. Id. (quoting Hartman, State Taxation at 122 (cited in note 84)).
86. Id.
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imposing a strict fair-relation requirement with respect to "user
fees"-found those precedents inapplicable to the "ordinary tax"
involved in Commonwealth Edison.87
In distinguishing its earlier user-fee cases, the Court over-
looked the irony that marked its analysis. This irony existed because
in Commonwealth Edison the Court relied on the state's "proprietary
interest in its public property"88 to justify heightened dormant
87. See, for example, Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-15 at 443 (cited in note 13)
("The Court saw no need for a factual inquiry into the relationship between the revenues
generated by the tax and the value of the benefits and services conferred on the coal
companies... because the severance tax was not a user fee but a general revenue tax."). For an
illustration of the significance of the post-Commonwealth Edison difference between user fees
and taxes with respect to the fair-relation standard, compare Western Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Cory,
726 F.2d 1340, 1344 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding constitutional violation in fixing of pipeline corridor
rent because "throughput charge is not directed toward compensating the State for the use of
the land" when calculated without regard either to "wear and tear" from use or assessed value),
affd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 471 U.S. 81 (1985), with Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1331, 1345-46, 131 L. Ed. 2d 261 (1995) (finding no "fair relation
prong" problem with sales tax applied to bus-ticket purchase because in tax cases the state is
not 'limited to offsetting the public costs created by the taxed activity"; thus a taxpayer can "be
made to.. .'contribute to the cost of providing all governmental services, including those
services from which it arguably receives no direct 'benefi'" (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488
U.S. 252, 267 (1989))). Other cases that highlight the significance of this feature of
Commonwealth Edison include USA Recycling, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1285 n.12
(2d Cir. 1995) (noting required difference in applying "fairly related" requirement to a "user fee"
and a "tax,'); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority, 906 F.2d 516, 518
(11th Cir. 1990) (stating that "user fee cases are not measured by the same standard as general
revenue tax cases" and noting that the distinctive prohibition on charges "manifestly
disproportionate to the services rendered" is applicable solely to "user fees" after Commonwealth
Edison); Shell Oil Co. v. City of Santa Monica, 830 F.2d 1052, 1059 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1987)
(characterizing charge for pipeline easement as a "user fee[ ] [which] must be proportional to the
value of the services rendered" even though "the level of taxation ... lies almost exclusively
within the determination of the taxing jurisdiction"). See also Reidy Terminal, Inc. v. Director
of Revenue-Missouri, 989 S.W.2d 540 (Mo. 1995) (en banc) (applying Evansville-Vanderburgh
fair relation requirement to invalidate fee charged to above-ground storage tank owner to help
fund insurance program for underground storage tanks); Hartley Marin Corp. v. Mierke, 474
S.E.2d 599, 608 n.13 (W. Va. 1996) (suggesting difference between analysis of "'user' fees or
tolls" and "general revenue tax," but obliquely concluding, on facts presented, "we find it
unnecessary to characterize the [challenged charge] as a general revenue tax or otherwise").
The confusion that pervades this field is evidenced by a recent Fourth Circuit decision that
suggests that user fees are subject to a more lenient dormant Commerce Clause analysis than
state taxes. See Center for Auto Safety, Inc. v. Athey, 37 F.3d 139, 142-43 (4th Cir. 1994)
(suggesting that a less stringent standard applies to user fees than to taxes and characterizing
the charge on a charity-solicitor as a "user fee"). This assertion is hardly surprising, given the
Supreme Court's endorsement of this view in pre-Complete Auto Transit user-fee cases. See, for
example, Evansville, 405 U.S. at 712-13 (indicating that state authority to impose charges on
interstate movement is heightened when "a State at its own expense furnishes special facilities
for the use of those engaged in commerce" (quoting Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 624
(1915))). See generally notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
88. Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 622 n.12 (quoting Hartman, State Taxation at 122
(cited in note 84)).
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commerce clause scrutiny of user fees, even though only one term
earlier the Court had purported to exempt state "proprietary
activities" altogether from dormant commerce clause attack.8 9
Perhaps the Court did not pause to consider the market-participant
principle in Commonwealth Edison because it neglected, in the
context of a tax case, even to notice that it was there. The Court was
traveling in one hemisphere, and it failed to see what was happening
in the other. In particular, it missed the fact that the state's status as
a proprietor was paradoxically dictating heightened judicial scrutiny
in dormant commerce clause "tax" cases, while simultaneously dictat-
ing reduced judicial scrutiny in cases involving state "regulations."
V. RECONCILING THE COURT'S USER-FEE AND
MARKET-PARTICIPANT DECISIONS
A. The Case Against a User-Fee Exception to the
Market-Participant Rule
Like Oregon Waste Systems, the Commonwealth Edison case
highlights the tension that has been building beneath the Court's
"user-fee" and "market-participant" jurisprudence. The pathway to
releasing that tension is not clearly marked. Any such effort, how-
ever, must proceed from a logical beginning-point-by asking whether
there is some functional difference between state discrimination in
fixing user fees and state discrimination by way of other resource-
distribution policies (such as resident-favoring subsidies or outright
refusals to deal with nonresidents) that the Court has upheld in its
past market-participant decisions.
It might be said that when a state charges a monetary fee, it is
appropriate to prohibit discrimination against interstate commerce
because a state must lie in the bed it makes. In other words, if a state
imposes a "user fee," it must stand ready to defend the "fee" in terms
of the actual value of the "use" of government facilities the purchaser
receives. 90 Arguably, it follows from this view that a state may not
89. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439. See generally notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
90. See Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 462 (1978) ('A governmental body
has an obvious interest in making those who specifically benefit from its services pay the
cost... provided that the charge is structured to compensate the government for the benefit
conferred. ... "); Atlantic and Pacific Telegraph Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160, 164 (1903)
("True it is often said that a license tax is in its nature arbitrary... But such observations are
pertinent only in case the license is resorted to for the purposes of revenue. When it is
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discriminate against nonresidents in charging user fees because non-
residents necessarily receive no greater value than do residents in
buying precisely the same service from the state.
The difficulty with this analysis is that it lacks support in con-
siderations of fairness and logic. Basic market theory teaches that a
reasonable fee is what a willing buyer and seller agree upon, and the
law in general eschews judicial second-guessing of prices fixed by
contracting parties.9 1 Nor do dormant commerce clause concerns
about facilitating free-flowing trade necessarily favor imposition of a
constitutional price-discrimination prohibition on the states. This is
the case because a state unable to charge discriminatory fees for its
goods will have two, and only two, choices: (1) to transfer its goods to
in-staters and out-of-staters on equal terms,92 or (2) to transfer its
goods to in-staters, while not making those goods available to out-of-
staters at all.93 The selection of the latter course of action (a plausible
choice given state officials' built-in loyalty to only their own constitu-
ents, and a permissible choice under the market-participant excep-
tion4) would hardly comport with the commerce clause preference for
maximum unimpeded movement of goods and services across state
lines.9 5
Put differently, creating an exemption for discriminatory user
fees from the market-participant principle would produce a profound
anomaly-as illustrated by Reeves.96 In that case, the Court upheld
authorized only in support of police supervision the expense of such supervision determines the
amount of the charge.. . ."). The Court in Commonwealth Edison suggested a receptiveness to
this "sleep in your own bed" line of reasoning. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 622 n.12
(Because such charges are purportedly assessed to reimburse the State for costs incurred in
providing specific quantifiable services, [the Court] ha[s] required a showing, based on factual
evidence in the record, that 'the fees charged do not appear to be manifestly disproportionate to
the services rendered .... '" (quoting Clark, 306 U.S. at 599)).
91. See, for example, Hardesty v. Smith, 3 Ind. 39, 42 (1851) ('Where... there is no fraud,
or warranty, express or implied, or mistake as to facts, the parties are bound by the contracts
they make."). See generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 79 (1979).
92. See Guy, 100 U.S. at 434.
93. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 429.
94. See note 93 and accompanying text.
95. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 445 ("It would be odd indeed to find that when a state becomes
less parochial ... its purpose becomes suspect under the Commerce Clause." (quoting KIS.B.
Technical Sales Corp. v. North Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774, 787 (N.J.,
1977))). Compare Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 50 n.9
(1983) (rejecting a claim of access to school mailboxes by a union rival of teachers' exclusive
bargaining representative, which did have access; and stating "[this] attempt to build a public
forum... is untenable; it would invite schools to close their mail systems to all but school
personne').
96. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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South Dakota's decision to restrict-to South Dakotans sales of cement
produced by a state-owned plant. If South Dakota can wholly exclude
potential out-of-state buyers from purchasing state-made cement,
however, it surely should be able to trade with out-of-staters, but
simply charge them a higher price. The greater power of total exclu-
sion logically should include the lesser power of only partial exclusion
through the fixing of price.97 And if a state can price-discriminate
against non-residents in selling cement, it also should be free to price-
discriminate in the sale of other goods or services.
In the landfill context, lower courts have reached precisely this
conclusion. Thus, just as surely as courts have recognized that state-
owned landfills may freely turn away out-of-staters under the market-
participant exception, 98 they have recognized too that public landfills
may let out-of-staters in, while charging them higher fees.99 Are these
cases wrongly decided in light of the user-fee anti-discrimination rule?
It might be said that the rule is simply inapplicable in landfill
cases. Such cases, the argument runs, do not involve a "user fee" at
all; instead they involve a "charge" or a "price." This effort to substi-
tute labels to skirt the tension between the user-fee and market-par-
ticipant cases has its enticements. Its basic advantage is that it frees
courts to exempt such items as college "tuition" or camping site
"rentals"-traditionally thought to be fixable in ways that favor state
97. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1512, 134 L. Ed. 2d 711
(1996) C[W]e do not dispute the proposition that greater powers include lesser ones. . . ."); FERC
v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982) (where "Congress could have pre-empted the field" there
is no constitutional violation where "Congress adopted a less intrusive scheme" that merely
required states to "consider the suggested federal standards"). In Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), the Court, in applying the dormant Commerce Clause, made
precisely the point that a '"imited preference" is less objectionable than a "total denial." Id. at
956. Moreover, a footnote in Reeves itself offers evidence that the fixing of prices-including
discriminatory prices-is among the sort of activities protected by the market-participant
principle. It states that "Itihere should be little question that South Dakota at least could exact
a premium on out-of-state purchases to compensate it for the State's investment and risk" and
describes this "added markup" as a "permissible result." 447 U.S. at 444 n.17. See Collins, 63
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 106-07 (cited note 13) (citing Reeves for the proposition that a "state
participating in the market may charge less to local commerce than to its external com-
petitors.....).
98. See, for example, Medical Waste Associates Ltd. v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 966 F.2d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[Ihe City... could have built and operated the
medical waste facility itself and reserved the entire capacity of the facility for its residents.").
See also Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. at 351 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Alabama may, under the market participant doctrine, open its own facility catering
only to Alabama customers.").
99. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. State of South Carolina, 945 F.2d 781 (4th Cir.
1991); Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989); Lefrancois
v. State of Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D.R.I. 1987); Evergreen Waste Systems, Inc. v.
Metropolitan Service Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127 (D. Or. 1986).
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residents-from the Court's broadly stated anti-discrimination rule.lo0
The disadvantage of this approach is that it makes no sense. Charges
for use of a camp, college, or hospital do constitute user fees for the
simple reason that they reflect fees paid to use state facilities and
services. The Supreme Court has recognized as much.1°
It does not advance constitutional analysis simply to declare
that some state-imposed contractual charges are "user fees," while
others are not--especially in light of the Court's repeated insistence
that the "practical effect" of an exaction, rather than its label, should
control for commerce clause purposes.10 2 The critical question thus
becomes whether sound constitutional policy supports the view that
certain user fees, but not others, are properly sheltered from dormant
commerce clause attack.
100. See notes 57-60 (discussing tuition differentials and discriminatory park, camping,
and hunting fees). See also Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 S. Ct. Rev.
217, 258 ("The benefits of public institutions such as schools, universities and libraries... have
all, traditionally and uncontroversially been distributed according to place of residency"). The
variety of ways in which the state can sell goods or services should not be underestimated. See,
for example, Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (sale of hospital
services by state); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (sale of bottled water by
state); LCM Enterprises, Inc. v. Town of Dartmouth, 14 F.3d 675 (1st Cir. 1994) (rental of boat
moorings by state); Hawaii Boating Ass'n, 651 F.2d at 661 (rental of berths in recreational boat
harbor by state); Cole v. Housing Authority of City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970)
(rental of housing by state); International Organization of Master, Mates & Pilots v. Andrews,
626 F. Supp. 1271 (D. Alaska 1986) (state-owned ferries). See also American Commuters Ass'n
v. Levitt, 279 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (rejecting nonresidents' claims of equal access to
public magnet high school, state-awarded college scholarships, and low-price fishing license
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause); Westchester County v. Koch, 438 N.Y.S. 2d 951
(Sup. Ct. 1981) (rejecting equal protection challenges to city practice of providing lower public
bus fares to certain residents).
101. See note 29 and accompanying text. In Oregon Waste Systems, the Court explained
that user fees are "charge[s] imposed by the State for the use of state-owned or state-provided
transportation or other facilities and services." 511 U.S. at 103 n.6 (quoting Commonwealth
Edison, 453 U.S. at 621). In contrast, the Court noted that "tax payments are received for the
general purposes of the [government] .... " Id. at 104 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 128
(1968)). The Supreme Coures definition of user fees comports with common usage. See, for
example, Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in
Taxation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 895, 901 (1992) (stating that "transfers of value to the
government ... for specific services (such as a subway ride or college education) ... are called
user fees").
102. See, for example, Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 615 C'[O]ur goal has ... been
to... focus[] on the 'practical effect of a challenged tax."' (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 405, 443 (1980))); Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S.
at 279 ('[The Court has applied this practical analysis in approving many types of tax... ");
Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 431 (1946) C(Not the tax in ... words, but its practical
consequences.., are our concern.").
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B. The Channels-of-Commerce Reconciliation of the User-Fee and
Market-Participant Cases
Is there a constitutional principle that draws a logical line
between permissibly and impermissibly discriminatory state user
fees? In fact there is. On close examination, the Court's user-fee
decisions are fully reconcilable with its market-participant decisions
and in effect reflect a limit on the market-participant exception to the
dormant Commerce Clause. Under this "exception to the exception,"
even though a state typically may discriminate against outsiders in
charging for state-provided property and services, it may not do so
when affording access to roads, waterways, and other channels of
interstate trade. The propriety of this doctrinal synthesis is sup-
ported by: (1) the Court's actual user-fee decisions; (2) the historical
underpinnings of the Commerce Clause; (3) economic logic that reso-
nates with underlying commerce clause theory; and (4) the Court's
modern commerce clause cases that deal with state regulation of
transportation corridors.
1. The Court's Decisions
The actual decisions in which the Court has recognized and
applied its user-fee anti-discrimination principle comport fully with
the "channels-of-commerce" synthesis offered here. As we already
have seen, the Court has stated its prohibition on discriminatory user
fees in strict and sweeping terms.03 At least so far, however, the
Court has limited its application of the principle to cases involving (1)
state waterway improvements; (2) state roads; and (3) state airports.
a. The Wharfage Cases
The Court's initial encounters with state user fees grew out of
legal challenges to local waterway charges. The earliest attacks
directed at such charges rested on the constitutional provision that
bars states from imposing "any Duty of Tonnage."104 Invoking this
clause, the Court prohibited states from taxing vessels for the use of
unimproved waters and shorelines. 1 5  The Court, however,
103. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
104. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
105. See, for example, Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 283 (1878); Packet Co.
v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 88-89 (1877); Cannon v. New Orleans, 87 U.S. (20 Wallace) 577, 581
(1874).
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simultaneously held that states had broad power to fix
charges--commonly called "wharfage" fees-to secure compensation
for the use of state-owned docks and other waterway improvements. 106
Indeed, the Court was so solicitous of state autonomy in these cases
that it upheld wharfage charges even when explicitly computed on the
basis of a ship's "tonnage."107
Faced with this state-protective interpretation of the Duty of
Tonnage Clause, shipowners turned to the Commerce Clause.
Applying the Commerce Clause, however, the Court continued to
validate state charges for state-made improvements, even when
imposed on vessels moving in interstate commerce. 08 In initially
articulating this principle, the Court implied that the Commerce
Clause would bar public wharf owners from fixing charges that were
"unreasonable" or "excessive."109 In later decisions, however, the
106. See, for example, Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559, 561 (1881) (distinguishing a
tax from monies "paid for the use of [the city's] wharf or improved landing-place"); Vicksburg v.
Tobin, 100 U.S. 430, 432 (1879) (upholding city ordinance exacting "wharfage-fees by way of
compensation for the use of an improved wharf'); Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U.S. 423, 430
(1879) ('[The city was not prohibited by the [Commerce Clause] from collecting the wharfage
fees.., as reasonable compensation for the use of its wharves."); Packet Co., 95 U.S. at 84-85
(I[A] charge for services rendered or for conveniences provided is in no sense a tax....");
Cannon, 87 U.S. at 582 (holding that a city that is "the owner of [wharves], built by its own
money, [may] exact and receive [a] reasonable compensation"); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of
the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 Howard) 299, 314 (1851) (distinguishing "charges for
wharfage or towage, or any other local port-charges for services rendered" from "imposts, or
duties on imports, exports, or tonnage"). The Court has reaffirmed this rule in more recent
decisions. See, for example, Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. Comm'n, 296 U.S. 261, 266-
67 (1935) (upholding a fee charged for each vessel entering port to defray the costs of policing
harbor).
107. See Ouachita Packet Company v. Aiken, 121 U.S. 444, 448 (1887); Transportation Co.
v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 704 (1882); Packet Co., 95 U.S. at 88.
108. See, for example, Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 267 ("[C]harges levied by state
authority to defray the cost of regulation or of facilities afforded in aid of interstate or foreign
commerce have consistently been held to be permissible."); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania,
114 U.S. 196, 217 (1885) (striking down, under the Commerce Clause, a tax on goods and
persons ferried across state lines, but noting that "charges... by way of compensation for the
use of the property employed, or for facilities afforded for its use" are permissible). The Court
has extended this principle to waterway improvements other than wharves. See, for example,
Sands v. Manistee River Improvement Co., 123 U.S. 288, 295 (1887) (waterway improvements
resulting from clearing, dredging, and work on embankment); Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 548-
49 (1886) (canal locks).
109. See Packet Co., 105 U.S. at 565 (permitting city to charge for wharf use "not... based
exclusively on a reimbursement of the cost of the wharf," but nonetheless barring fees that are
"1excessive" or "an abuse of the power confided to the trustees"); Packet Co., 100 U.S. at 429
(upholding wharfage "not out of proportion to the advantages and benefits enjoyed in the use of
the improved wharf').
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Court retreated from this view and held that the reasonableness of
wharfage charges was strictly a matter of "local" law.11
The Court's hands-off approach to assessing the reasonable-
ness of wharfage charges did not resolve a separate issue: Could
states charge fees for state-owned waterway improvements that dis-
criminated against interstate commerce? This issue surfaced in Guy
v. Baltimore.111 In Guy, Baltimore defended a discriminatory fee
structure, arguing that, as a wharf owner, it constitutionally could fix
wharfage charges at any level for any user.112 The shipowner, in re-
sponse, pointed to a growing line of decisions that condemned state
discrimination against interstate commerce."l 3 The Court divided on
the issue, with Chief Justice Waite reasoning in dissent that the state
should be able to discriminate in fixing fees for its own wharves, so
long as it sought nothing more than "reasonable compensation" from
interstate traffic.14 In the majority's view, however, Baltimore's own-
ership of the wharves did not protect its discriminatory user fee
against constitutional attack. The city could "permit the public
wharves, which it owns, to be used without charge."1 ' The city could
"also exact wharfage fees, equally, from all who use its improved
wharves.""16 The city's outright discrimination in fixing fees, however,
unconstitutionally operated "to hinder, obstruct, or burden inter-state
commerce in the interest of commerce wholly internal to that
State."17
b. The Road Cases
Once the Court had navigated its way through the nineteenth-
century wharfage cases, a distinctly twentieth-century cluster of
disputes made claims upon its docket. These cases involved fees
imposed on motorists for the use of state highways. In particular,
truck and bus operators argued that road-use charges, as applied to
110. See Ouachita Packet Co., 121 U.S. at 448 (affirming city's ability to charge wharfage,
even when unreasonable in amount, absent contrary state law or federal legislation);
Transportation Co., 107 U.S. at 700 (recognizing "undoubted rule of universal application that
wharfage... must be reasonable," but ascribing rule to local, rather than federal constitutional,
law).
111. 100 U.S. 434 (1879).
112. Id. at 441.
113. See id. at 437 (listing decisions).
114. Id. at 444.
115. Id. at 442.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 443. Nor did the Courts decision in Guy stand alone. In Tobin, 100 U.S. at 431,
the Court noted, in upholding a fee for the use of a state-owned wharf, that it was "uniformly
collected."
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cross-border movements, violated the Supreme Court's then-categori-
cally-stated ban on state taxation of interstate commerce. 118 The
Court, however, rebuffed these challenges. Although states could not
tax interstate traffic per se,"9 they could force interstate shippers and
travelers to pay a fee for the use of state property in the form of state
roads.12 0
The fighting issue in the state road cases concerned how states
could structure their charges. In particular, the Court struggled
through a series of challenges to "flat" license fees imposed on inter-
state and intrastate road users without apportionment for the num-
ber of miles traveled in the state. 21  The Court signaled in these
cases, in curious contrast to its earlier wharfage decisions,22 that the
Commerce Clause required charges for the use of state thoroughfares
to be "reasonable."123 Perhaps because of Guy, however, the Court
encountered no cases of outright discrimination against interstate
118. See, for example, Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 400 (1913) C[Ihe States cannot
tax interstate commerce, either by laying the tax upon the business which constitutes such
commerce or the privilege of engaging in it, or upon the receipts, as such, derived from it; or
upon persons or property in transit in interstate commerce.') (citations omitted); Telegraph Co.
v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460, 466 (1881) (invoking principle to invalidate tax on telegraph messages
passing over company's lines); Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wallace) 232, 278
(1872).
119. See, for example, Ingels, 300 U.S. at 296.
120. Id. at 294 (concluding that a state can collect fees "demanded as reimbursement for
the expense of providing facilities, or of enforcing regulations of the commerce which are within
its constitutional power"); Hendrick, 235 U.S. at 624 (distinguishing "direct taxe from "charge for
the use of valuable facilities"); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. at 405 (stating that states
"may... exact tolls for the use of artificial facilities provided under its authority"). See also
Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. at 277-78 C"Ve concede the right and power of
the.., owners .... be [they] the State or grantees of franchises from the State, to exact what
they please for the use of their ways. That right is an attribute of ownership.... A tax is a
demand of sovereignty; a toll is a demand of proprietorship.").
The Court has applied the same principle to other users of public thoroughfares. See St.
Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 148 U.S. 92, 97 (1893) (distinguishing tax from
"charge... imposed for the privilege of using the streets, alleys and public places" of city to
erect telegraph poles).
121. These cases are collected and discussed in American Trucking Ass'ns, 483 U.S. at 292-
94, and Evansville, 405 U.S. at 715-16.
122. See notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
123. Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 170 (1928). See, for example, Interstate
Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 185-86 (1931) ("[A] State... may impose even upon motor
vehicles engaged exclusively in interstate commerce a charge, as compensation for the use of the
public highways, which... will be sustained unless the taxpayer shows that it bears no reason-
able relation to the privilege...."). See also Western Union Telegraph, 148 U.S. at 105 (holding,
in a statutory case, that in charging for placement of telegraph poles along city streets "all that
[the city] can insist upon is, in this respect, reasonable compensation... ; and it follows in the
nature of things that it does not lie exclusively in its power to determine what is reasonable
rental," so that the "inquiry must be open in the courts").
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traffic in the imposition of vehicle license charges or road tolls.
24
Nevertheless, the Court made it clear in its rulings that discrimina-
tion in fixing highway user fees would offend the Commerce Clause. 25
c. The Airport Cases
The Court's wharfage and highway decisions set the stage for
its most recent appraisals of user fees in cases involving government-
owned airports. In the seminal case, Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport
Authority v. Delta Airlines, 26 commercial airlines attacked two one-
dollar-per-passenger fees imposed for the use of public airport facili-
ties.127 The Court, however, upheld the fees, emphasizing that they
were levied for the use of a "facility provided at public expense." 28
Finding its "decisions concerning highway tolls" particularly instruc-
124. Indeed, the Court in Guy had rejected Baltimore's claimed power to discriminate in
fixing fees for use of its wharf by reasoning that "Itihe city can no more do this than it or the
State could discriminate against the citizens and products of other States in the use of the
public streets or other public highways." 100 U.S. at 442. See also Western Union Telegraph,
148 U.S. at 98-99 (noting that access to streets and roads for the "ordinary traveller, whether on
foot or in a vehicle .... is a use open equally to citizens of other States with those of the State in
which the street is situate").
125. See Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Railroad Commissioners, 332 U.S. 495, 501-03
(1947) (upholding two flat truck taxes "imposed 'in consideration of the use of the highways'"
because "[n]either exaction discriminates against interstate commerce"); Morf, 298 U.S. at 410
(concluding that a state may charge a "toll for the privilege of entering and using the
highways.. . if non-discriminatory"); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
295 U.S. 285, 289 (1935) (upholding annual flat license fee laid upon motor vehicle transport
solely to fund upkeep of state roads because "it is exacted without hostility to foreign or
interstate transactions"); Sprout, 277 U.S. at 169-70 (permitting states to impose "non-
discriminatory regulations" on users of local highways including "license fee no larger.., than
is reasonably required to defray the expense of administering the regulations" and "a reasonable
charge as their fair contribution to the cost of constructing and maintaining the public
highways"); Clark, 274 U.S. at 557 (upholding certificate fee imposed on motor transportation
company because "[tihere is no suggestion that the tax discriminates against interstate
commerce"); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 168 (1916) (upholding a state's ability to secure
compensation for the use of its highways if it "does not involve discrimination against
nonresidents"); Hendrick, 235 U.S. at 624 (citing cases for proposition that "where a State at its
own expense furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in commerce," the charge
imposes no unlawful burden on interstate commerce if it is "fixed according to some uniform,
fair and practical standard"). See also Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306
U.S. 72, 76 (1939) (quoting Hendrick's "uniform, fair and practical standard" with approval). In
Clark, the Court found no unconstitutional discrimination because exempted intrastate truckers
engaged in a business different in character from the interstate and intrastate motor vehicle
transporters subjected to the challenged license fee. By thus evaluating the claim of unlawful
discrimination on the merits, the Court made clear its continued adherence to the anti-
discrimination principle of Guy. Clark, 274 U.S. at 557.
126. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
127. The case involved two separate $1 fees, one imposed by New Hampshire and one
imposed by the Airport Authority of Evansville, Indiana. Id. at 709-11.
128. Id. at 714.
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tive, 12 9 the Court reasoned that "a charge designed only to make the
user of state-provided facilities pay a reasonable fee to help defray the
costs of their construction and maintenance may constitutionally be
imposed. 130  As in its wharfage and highway cases, however, the
Court emphatically insisted that the fee not be "discriminatory
against interstate commerce 131 and, in its analysis of the case, fo-
cused on whether such discrimination was present. 32 In the end,
however, the Court found no constitutional problem because "both
interstate and intrastate flights are subject to the same charges."' 33
The Court's reaffirmation of the user-fee anti-discrimination
rule in Evansville preceded its recognition of the market-participant
exception to the dormant Commerce Clause in Alexandria Scrap'3
and its progeny.135 Given the Court's endorsement of even stark dis-
crimination in these more recent state resource distribution cases, one
might conclude that it has overridden sub silentio the anti-discrimina-
tion principle set forth in Evansville and earlier user-fee decisions.
The Court's market-participant rulings, however, give no hint of any
such intention, and the Court has adhered to its user-fee precedents
in the post-Alexandria Scrap context.136 Indeed, as we already have
seen, the Court reiterated the user-fee anti-discrimination rule only
129. Id. at 715.
130. Id. at 714.
131. Id. at 717.
132. Id.
133. Id. Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Evansville case was that the challenged
user charges were imposed entirely on commercial air flights, the "vast majority" of which were
interstate in nature, id., while no fees were imposed on users of private, noncommercial planes,
who, presumably, made many intrastate journeys. This fact took on greater significance when
the Court indicated that the fees actually charged would not be deemed unconstitutionally
"excessive in relation to costs incurred by the taxing authorities," id. at 719, unless they ex-
ceeded all airport costs, including those costs specifically associated with intrastate noncom-
mercial travel. Id. at 719-20. It was enough for the Court to find that "[c]ommercial air traffic
requires more elaborate navigation and terminal facilities, as well as longer and more costly
runway systems, than do flights by smaller private planes," id. at 718, so that the facilities
existed "primarily" to meet commercial aviation's "special needs." Id. at 719. It is an interest-
ing question whether the Court would be as tolerant of a comparable exemption for non-com-
mercial users if the record contained evidence that airport costs were substantially attributable
to local, non-commercial operations.
134. See notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
135. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
136. See Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 464 (reiterating the Evansville test, including the
requirement that charges "not discriminate against interstate commerce"); American Trucking
Ass'ns Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 296 (1987) (applying Evansville-Vanderburgh standard).
Lower courts have also adhered to the user-fee anti-discrimination principle. See, for example,
Wallach v. Brezenoff, 930 F.2d 1070, 1072 (3rd Cir. 1991); Alamo Rent-A-Car, 906 F.2d at 519-
21; Western Oil and Gas Ass'n, 726 F.2d at 1344.
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three terms ago in its Oregon Waste Systems decision. 137 Even more
significantly, during that same term the Court directly applied the
anti-discrimination rule in evaluating an airport user fee in
Northwest Airlines.138  How, in light of the market-participant
principle, can these recent user-fee decisions be explained?
d. Pulling Together the User-Fee Decisions
The unifying theme of the Court's past user-fee cases is recog-
nizable upon reflection. Its cases involving state waterways, roads,
and airports are tied together by a common thread: Each involved a
state charge for access to an important conduit of interstate move-
ment.
It follows that the central message of these cases-when read
in light of their facts-is that the Court has strictly barred discrimi-
nation in setting fees for the use of the "channels of interstate com-
merce." 139 Another message is that the Court, at least in its hold-
ings,140 has so far gone no further.141 Perhaps it should. After all,
when a state charges a fee for the use of a state road-no less so than
when it charges a fee for use of a state library, campground, or land-
fill-it is controlling access to a facility built and owned by the state
itself.142 Given this reality, should the Court overrule the anti-dis-
crimination principle set forth in its past user-fee decisions in light of
its recent and repeated recognition of the market-participant excep-
tion?
Many of us sense that a negative answer to this question is
proper because the "transportation cases raise a discrete set of con-
cerns."143 But why? We might say that restrictions on access to wa-
137. See note 39 and accompanying text
138. Northwest Airlines, 510 U.S. at 369.
139. Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 451 n.335 (cited in note 13).
140. See notes 24-29 and accompanying text (discussing not the holdings, but the broad
language, of Courts past decisions).
141. See Northwest Airlines, 510 U.S. at 372 (citing "Evansville's instruction that airport
tolls be nondiscriminatory" (emphasis added)); id. at 866 (citing American Trucking Ass'ns, 483
U.S. at 268-69, as a case "invalidating state highway use taxes" (emphasis added)).
142. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
143. Swin Resource Systems, 883 F.2d at 254. For a similarly conclusory suggestion that
cases involving state-owned channels of interstate commerce fall outside the market-participant
principle, see Shell Oil Co., 830 F.2d at 1057 (expressing worry about city's exploitation of
"lands held in a sovereign capacity that are recognized transportation corridors," given the
special importance of "publicly controlled transportation corridors... to the free flow of com-
merce"); Western Oil and Gas Ass'n, 726 F.2d at 1343 (expressing concern that "control over the
channels of interstate commerce permits the State to erect substantial impediments to the free
flow of commerce"). See also Procter & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69, 77 (7th Cir.
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terways, roads, and airports clog the very "arteries of the national
market."'" With no less rhetorical exuberance, we might add that the
"channels of commerce" are "essential to the market itself' and to the
very "ability to do business." 45
But so what? It is fair to say, for example, that basic building
materials are "essential to the market" and to the "ability to do
business." It is an unusual business, after all, that can operate with
no roof over its head. Yet in Reeves the Court held that states could
discriminate against nonresidents in affording access to even the most
indispensable building supplies if those supplies were produced by the
state itself.14 Why, then, can states not similarly discriminate in
providing access to state-produced highways, waterway
improvements, and airports? The answer to this inquiry lies in the
historical purposes of the Commerce Clause and the policy concerns
that have animated its modern "dormant" component.
2. The Purposes of the Commerce Clause
a. The Pro-Transportation Purpose of the Commerce Clause
It is well-known that the Framers forged the Commerce Clause
to neutralize obstructions to interstate trade that had arisen under
the Articles of Confederation. 147 It is less well known that the
Framers' concerns focused largely on state interference with the
transit of articles of commerce.'"8 In particular, as the Framers
crafted the Constitution, they feared state threats to the free move-
1975) (finding no commerce clause violation because "we are not confronted with a situation in
which legislation has reduced the effectiveness of a means of transportation itself').
144. Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 450 (cited in note 13).
145. Gergen, 66 Tex. L. Rev. at 1132-33 & n.188 (cited in note 13). See also Regan, 84
Mich. L. Rev. at 1184 (cited in note 13) (noting "the special importance of an effective transpor-
tation network" to interstate commerce). Of course, the economic importance of transportation
to the economy of the nation cannot be gainsaid. As one economist has explained: "[Tihe unique
position which transportation occupies in economic activity arises from the reduction by it of the
resistances of time and space to the production of economic goods and services." Dudley Frank
Pegrum, Transportation Economics and Public Policy 19 (Irwin, 3d ed. 1973). See also Russell
E. Westmeyer, Economics of Transportation 6 (Prentice-Hall, 1952) ("[I]mproved transportation
also makes possible a division of labor on a geographical or territorial basis which has contrib-
uted importantly to increased production and higher standards of living.").
146. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 429.
147. See, for example, Alexandi'ia Scrap, 426 U.S. at 807-08; H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S.
at 535-39.
148. See Collins, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 54 (cited in note 13).
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ment of commerce resulting from the exploitation of favorable loca-
tions along important trade routes.149 As the Court itself explained in
one of its earliest applications of the dormant Commerce Clause:
[P]robably the transportation of articles of trade from one State to another was
the prominent idea in the minds of the framers of the Constitution, when to
Congress was committed the power to regulate commerce among the several
States. A power to prevent embarrassing restrictions by any State was the
thing desired.150
This constitutional history lends potent support to the Court's re-
peated insistence that "freedom of transportation between the States"
is secured by the Commerce Clause even in the absence of congres-
sional action.1 51 More importantly for present purposes, this history
helps justify the "channels of commerce" reconciliation of the Court's
market-participant and user-fee decisions offered here. To nationalist
Constitution-writers whose "prominent idea" was protecting "the
transportation of articles of trade," a distinctively aggressive judicial
role in ensuring equal access to roads, airports, and waterways could
hardly have seemed an unwelcome development.
b. The Anti-Tariff Purpose of the Commerce Clause
The channels-of-commerce synthesis of the Court's user-fee
and market-participant decisions also comports with a separate and
long-recognized purpose of the Commerce Clause: To eradicate state-
imposed protective tariffs. 152 Why does the Framers' focused concern
149. As Professor Collins reports, "writings at the time of the Convention... decried
exploitation of favorable geography to tax goods passing through ports on the way to or from
less favored states." Collins, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 53 (cited in note 13). A useful discussion of
this history appears in Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the
Position of the Judiciary, 67 Yale L. J. 219, 228-30 (1957). See also Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97
U.S. 566, 574 (1878) CIn granting to Congress the right to regulate commerce.., the
framers... believed that they had sufficiently guarded against... taxation by the States which
would interfere with the freest interchange of commodities....").
150. Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. at 275 (emphasis added). The Court added that:
[l]f one state can directly tax persons or property passing through it, or tax them
indirectly by levying a tax upon their transportation, every other may, and thus
commercial intercourse between States remote from each other may be destroyed.... It
was to guard against the possibility of such commercial embarrassments, no doubt, that
the power of regulating commerce among the States was conferred upon the Federal
government.
Id. at 280.
151. Gloucester Ferry Co., 114 U.S. at 217 (striking down state tax on persons and goods
transported interstate by ferry). See Covington Bridge v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 222 (1894).
152. "The national commerce power, it was hoped, would put an end to ... protective tariffs
on imports from other states." Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law 93 (Foundation Press, 12th
ed. 1991) (emphasis added). See, for example, Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 457-58 (1886)
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about tariffs cast a shadow over discriminatory user fees associated
with state-owned pathways of trade? Because, absent a prohibition
on this form of discrimination, states can impose tariffs in fact,
though not in name.
Consider West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy.153 In that case,
the Court invalidated a tax placed by the state in effect on sales of
out-of-state, but not in-state, milk. 54 This taxing scheme was
unconstitutional in the Court's eyes because it amounted to a "tariff"
that protected in-state dairy farmers from out-of-state competition.155
If the state were free to charge discriminatory fees for use of state
roads, however, it could readily replicate the "tariff' struck down in
West Lynn Creamery. To accomplish this result, the state need only
place a "fee" on those highway users who transport milk produced in
other states. 1 6
This illustration reveals the critical point: If a state can freely
fix fees for the use of traffic corridors within its borders, it can skew
in favor of private in-state producers every manner of commerce as
surely as it can by imposing tariffs. 57 The anti-tariff purpose of the
Commerce Clause thus strongly supports a special constitutional
prohibition on state discrimination in affording access to the path-
ways of interstate movement.
('[The object of vesting in Congress the power to regulate commerce... was to insure uniform-
ity of regulation against conflicting and discriminating state legislation.").
153. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
154. Id. at 196.
155. Id. at 194-96.
156. As stated by Professor Brown: "For these purposes it matters not whether the
exaction is a tariff or toll on the entrance of goods, or a tax on transportation." Brown, 67 Yale
L. J. at 229 (cited in note 149). Compare Collins, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 51-52 & n.68 (cited in
note 13) (noting that prohibition on state duties on ships was "needed to make.., effective" the
import-export clause's prohibition of"tariffs on goods" and that "[tihe Court has mirrored these
provisions in its rules for other forms of transport under the commerce clause").
157. See Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 105 n.8 (expressing concern about state
charges that "would allow a state to tax interstate commerce more heavily than in-state
commerce anytime the entities involved in interstate commerce happened to use facilities
supported by general state tax funds" (quoting Government Suppliers Consolidating Services v.
Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267, 1284 (7th Cir. 1992))). See also Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 656 (1994) (distinguishing cable television from newspapers, and subjecting it to closer
government regulation, in part because "by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for
cable speech, a cable operator can prevent its subscribers from obtaining access to programming
it chooses to exclude").
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3. Commerce Clause Policy
The potential for imposing de facto tariffs by way of discrimi-
natory transportation-corridor user fees goes far toward revealing
their incompatibility with modern dormant commerce clause policy.
This is so because-in keeping with efficiency-driven concerns about
the location of productive activity-the Court repeatedly has used the
Commerce Clause to nullify state laws that "neutralize advantages
belonging to the place of origin." 5
The special threat to efficiency posed by discriminatory infra-
structure access policies flows in large part from each state's ability to
capitalize on its unique physical location. As a leading commentator
has explained, "[t]he most durable form of market power is state con-
trol over ports and trade routes... .,159 Thus, absent judicial supervi-
sion, the state--"like a private monopolist"-can and will leverage
these resources to "raise prices and restrict trade."'160
These "economic realities" 6' were not lost on the Court when it
ruled in Reeves that South Dakota could exclude nonresidents from
sales of state-made cement. 62 In fact, the Court emphasized that
South Dakota lacked a durable monopoly position with respect to the
158. GAF. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. at 527. See also Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S.
577, 586 (1937) (upholding compensatory use tax on theory that it does not put a "clog upon the
process of importation").
159. Collins, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 71 (cited in note 13). See also Westmeyer, Economics of
Transportation at 8 (cited in note 145) Cqt is no accident that many of the world's great com-
mercial centers developed at or near points where navigable rivers entered the ocean or at the
confluence of two rivers or other bodies of water. London, Rotterdam, Hamburg,
Constantinople, Cairo, and Shanghai are but a few of such Old World points which come to
mind."). Building on another key theme of modern dormant commerce clause policy, Professor
Collins adds the following thought on the political dynamics that generate trade-route premi-
ums:
Few local interests are benefited by trucks, trains, buses, telegraph wires, or pipelines
crossing a state. Market adjustments overcome some costs, but monopoly power over
geographic routes, sunk costs of prior investments, and related factors for other markets
allow a significant degree of permanent cost exporting. Weak local political restraint is
straightforward. It corresponds to the self-interest of the state as a whole rather than to
that of local trade associations. Political temptation to extract a high price for passage
is constant over time.
Collins, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 73 (cited in note 13). Collins further notes that:
Where a state burdens commerce in transit by charging merchants for the use of state-
owned property with geographic advantages, costs are exported just as effectively as
when state taxes or regulations exploit geography to impose on commerce in transit.
Local political restraint on charges is then just as weak as in regulation or tax cases.
Charges are subject to none of the discipline that subsidies evoke.
Id. at 107.
160. Id. at 71.
161. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.
162. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 429.
826
1997] STATE USER FEES 827
market in cement. In particular, the Court stressed that cement
produced at the South Dakota plant had no intrinsically unique
characteristics. 163 Instead, it was a commodity available from many
other sources, including South Dakotans who previously had dealt
with the South Dakota plant. 64 No less important, South Dakota did
not possess unique access to limestone or other materials needed to
make cement. 65 Thus, other states and private entrepreneurs could
enter the cement production business in competition with South
Dakota. 66
The opposite is true with respect to state operation of roads
and other corridors of interstate commerce. Each state necessarily
has unique control of trade routes and trading hubs situated within
it. 167 In addition, at least in modern times, ownership of road systems
and other avenues of commerce has tended to be monopolized by the
states. A variety of factors explain why this is the case. State owner-
ship of road systems, for example, reflects economies of scale, the
sensibility of averting massive (and inefficient) private toll transac-
tion costs, the states' possession of the eminent-domain power, and
the near-universality of citizen interest in utilizing transportation
infrastructure.168 State ownership of roads also comports with the
distinctive value of comprehensive planning in this context and the
163. Id. at 444.
164. Id. at 444 n.17. See Collins, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 100 (cited in note 13) (noting that the
Court's market-participant decisions, including Reeves, "involved competitive markets not
dominated by the state").
165. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 444.
166. Id.
167. See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wallace) 35, 46 (1867) (striking down tax due to
concern that "one or more States covering the only practicable route of travel from the east to
the west, or from the north to the south, may totally prevent or seriously burden all transporta-
tion of passengers from one part of the country to the other").
168. See Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics 48-49 (McGraw-Hill,
12th ed. 1985) (describing "the building of highways" as the sort of activity well-suited to gov-
ernment as "[p]rivate provision of these public goods will not occur because the benefits of the
goods are dispersed so widely across the population that no single firm or consumer has an
incentive to provide them"); Pegrum, Transportation at 12 (cited in note 145) (The provision of
streets and highways is scarcely feasible on a private basis to any great extent."). Pegrum
explains that:
Government in one way or another is always called upon to assist in the process of
supplying transport facilities to the territories it encompasses .... [I]t arises from the
fact that governmental powers have to be exercised in order to secure feasible routes, to
provide streets and roads where organization under private ownership is not practicable;
to develop waterways and harbors, adequate navigation aids; and so
forth .... [E]conomic considerations ... seem to make government participation in
supplying transport unavoidable ....
Id. at 16.
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states' extraordinary interest in maximizing highway safety. 16 9 These
realities-together with the enormous barriers to private entry into
key transportation infrastructure "markets"-have left little room, as
a practical matter, for private entrepreneurs to compete in any mean-
ingful fashion with state-owned road systems and other transporta-
tion facilities.170 For this reason, the risk of market distortion will be
much greater if states are permitted to fix discriminatory rates for the
use of roads, waterways or airports than if the state is permitted to
set such rates for goods (like cement) or services (like education) that
are widely available from private sources.
Finally, whenever a state inhibits free movement through
transportation corridors, the deepest concerns underlying the
Commerce Clause come into play. At bottom, the dormant commerce
clause principle reflects a design not so much to foster economic
prosperity as to breed national cohesion and solidarity.171 Yet if states
can freely impede access to transportation corridors, cross-border
visits will diminish. Such a result is profoundly at odds with the
purpose of encouraging national attachments and loyalties, for there
seems to be no better way to instill identity with the nation as a whole
than to facilitate free movement through its far-flung and diverse
regions. 172 Concerns about fostering national cohesiveness-especially
169. Hendrick, 235 U.S. at 622.
170. This is not to say that there is no competition with respect to transportation services
and infrastructure. For example, most railroads-and railroad corridors-are privately owned.
State attempts to extract undue returns for use of state airports or roads thus may be disci-
plined by the competitive threat posed by railways. There are, however, obvious and significant
limits to the competitive threats that railroads pose. For example, it is often the case that goods
carried to a rail terminus must be moved by truck to their ultimate destination. As a result,
even if the principal carriage of goods is by rail, the state may impose a de facto tariff by way of
charges for the road-use leg of the trip. See notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
171. See, for example, Regan, 84 Mich. L. Rev. at 1114 (cited in note 13) (positing that the
Framers "feared not merely for the economic health, but also and even more for the political
viability of the infant United States"). See generally Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 433 (cited in
note 13) (collecting sources).
172. As stated in a leading treatise on transportation economics: "The unification of units
of governments is aided by transportation. In Western Europe, an improved transportation
system has had some unifying effect and has tended to mitigate somewhat the intense racial,
religious, political, and economic differences which have accumulated over many centuries."
Frank H. Mossman and Newton Morton, Principles of Transportation 5 (Ronald Press, 1957).
See also Emory Richard Johnson, Transportation: Economic Principles and Practices 545
(Appleton-Century, 1940) ("Un the constitutional period] problems were multiplied by the
isolation of one colony from others. Each grew to be self-governing and self-contained in its
political prejudices. Colonies were jealous of their neighbors and could not adjust their ideas
through travel among the colonies."); Pegrum, Transportation at 13-14 (cited in note 145) C'One
of the earliest requirements of this country immediately after the attaining of independence was
a system of transportation that would make a unified political life possible through adequate
communication and interchange among the members of the new nation."); Westmeyer,
Economics of Transportation, at 12 (cited in note 145) ('Good roads.., have played an
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when viewed in light of recognized liberty interests in unimpeded
interstate travel and a long legal tradition of affording broad access to
the means of movement173-thus support the Court's insistence that
states not discriminate in affording access to key channels of
interstate transportation.
4. The Modern Regulatory Transportation Cases
Commerce clause decisions outside of the user-fee context
confirm the special importance of protecting open access to the
corridors of interstate commerce. In interpreting the "affirmative"
side of the Commerce Clause, for example, the Court has held that
Congress's power is at its zenith when it legislates to safeguard the
"channels" and "instrumentalities" of interstate trade. 174 Even more
important, the Court has displayed a special sensitivity to mobility
values in a trilogy of decisions considering state road-use regulations
under the dormant Commerce Clause. 175
First, in Bibb v. Navaho Freight Lines, 76 the Court applied the
dormant Commerce Clause to invalidate an Illinois law that required
the use of contour mudguards by trucks and trailers on state roads.
Then, in Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 77 the Court
struck down a Wisconsin requirement that truck lengths not exceed
especially important role in this connection. By bringing the people of all parts of the United
States into contact with one another.., there is an opportunity for all to benefit from a
comparison of ideas and practices and from an understanding of each other's problems.").
173. As to the "right to travel," see, for example, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757
(1966) (holding that "[t]he constitutional right to travel... and necessarily to use the
highways.., in doing so, occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union");
Northwest Airlines, 510 U.S. at 363 (citing "the traditional American right to travel among the
States" (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-12, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973))). See also Wallach, 930 F.2d
at 1072 ("[A] user fee impermissibly burdens a citizen's constitutionally protected right to travel
[when it] discriminates against interstate travellers .. "). As to a tradition of access, see, for
example, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) ('Ownership does not always mean
absolute dominion.... Thus, the owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes, and
railroads may not operate them as freely as a farmer does his farm."); Donovan v. Pennsylvaia
Co., 199 U.S. 279, 303 (1905) (Generally speaking, public sidewalks and streets are for use by
all, upon equal terms .... ); County Commissioners v. Chandler, 96 U.S. 205, 208 (citing as
"elementary in the common law" that "the entire public has the right to use" a bridge built by a
private corporate franchisee of the state); Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 112, 124 (1858) (holding that a private franchisee operating a bridge "is liable to answer
in damages if it refuses to transport individuals on being paid or tendered the usual fare").
174. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
175. See generally Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-7 (cited in note 13) (discussing
the truck-safety cases).
176. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
177. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
fifty-five feet. Finally, in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.178
the Court jettisoned an Iowa statute that barred the use of sixty-five-
foot double tractor trailers.
Because each of the measures challenged in these cases
imposed conditions on access to state-owned property in the form of
state roads, the Court could have applied the market-participant
principle broadly to shield the measures from dormant commerce
clause attack. 17 9 The Court, however, did not take this route. Instead,
focusing solely on the strength of proffered state safety justifications
(and not at all on state proprietary interests), the Court struck down
even facially nondiscriminatory truck safety rules on the ground that
they unduly stifled the free interstate movement of goods. 8°
At bottom, these road-regulation decisions reflect the same
principle that has driven the Court's past user-fee decisions. Each set
of cases involved claimed rights of access to state-owned transporta-
tion corridors. Yet in each set of cases the Court declined to apply the
market-participant exception for the same reason: Because there
exists a dominant federal interest in ensuring full and equal access to
the avenues of interstate movement and trade.
5. A Possible Limit on the Transportation-User-Fee
Anti-Discrimination Rule
Some economists might fault the foregoing analysis-and the
total ban on discriminatory transportation user fees it advocates-on
the ground it reaches too far. On this view, the problem presented by
178. 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
179. See Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 450 (cited in note 13) (setting out the argument that
"[e]ach state's interest in channeling state benefits to its own citizenry gives rise to a... claim
that the state should be able to limit the use of its roads as it wishes").
180. See also South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189
(1938) (upholding truck weight rules, but observing that although "State may rightly prescribe
uniform regulations adapted to promote safety upon its highways," it "may not, under the guise
of regulation, discriminate against interstate commerce"); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307,
315-16 (1925) (invoking the Commerce Clause to overturn the denial of a certificate of
convenience and necessity to a trucker). The Court also has declined, in other dormant
commerce clause cases, to accede to state property-based claims to exercise plenary control over
access to state highways. In West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911), for example,
the issue was whether the state could bar construction of interstate, but not intrastate, gas
pipelines under state-owned road beds. In defending its program, that state argued broadly that
"[tihe State having control of the public highways may grant privileges to its own citizens and
refuse them to others...." Id. at 233-34. The Court, however, struck down the program,
stating: 'The power of the State of Oklahoma over highways is much discussed...; the
appellant contending for a power practically absolute .... This discrimination is beyond the
power of the State to make.... [N]o state can... discriminate against ... interstate
commerce ...." Id. at 261-62.
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the state's powerful market position with respect to transportation
infrastructure is not that it facilitates price discrimination, but in-
stead that it invites state action that "exports the costs of state gov-
ernment" to outsiders through the imposition of monopoly prices. 11 If
this is the essential problem, the argument goes, states should be free
to price-discriminate so long as they can show that they are not ex-
tracting monopoly profits from interests outside the state.
Assume, for example, that the State of Clairoid imposes a fee
of one dollar per one hundred miles of road use on transporters of out-
of-state agricultural produce, while placing no fee on transporters of
in-state produce. Assume also that, if a hauler of out-of-state produce
challenged this discrimination, Clairoid could bring in a raft of well-
credentialed economists to testify that the one dollar fee is fair in
light of comparable charges for road use in other states, the state's
costs in supplying its road services, and the like. In these circum-
stances, it is improbable that a court would say that Clairoid is
"export[ing] the costs of state government" to out-of-staters because,
according to the evidence, the state is charging nothing more than a
reasonable price. Under a cost-exporting-centered analysis, the
Clairoid fee thus should be upheld.
The challenger, however, could counter this analysis by argu-
ing that the Commerce Clause guards not only against cost-exporting,
but also against state action "that protects local producers from the
competition of out-of-state producers."182 Plainly, Clairoid's fee struc-
ture distorts "the geographical distribution of enterprise" 83 in this
way by increasing the marginal cost of every item of trucked-in pro-
duce, while not increasing the cost of marketing local farm products
at all.
Clairoid, however, can respond to this point by noting that the
Court has "never held.., that every state law which obstructs a na-
tional market violates the Commerce Clause."1 84 In particular, the
state would urge that its grant of free road use for the transport of in-
state produce is nothing more than a permissible business subsidy.185
On this view, as surely as the state could give its farmers outright
cash grants, it can give them what-in economists' eyes-is the same
thing: access to costly facilities without the need to pay. As a result,
181. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 638 (Little, Brown, 4th ed. 1992).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. West Lynn Creamery, 512 U.S. at 207 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. See, for example, New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277-78 (1988).
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Clairoid would say, the court should recognize and apply a fair-fee-
and-subsidy exception to the general ban on discriminatory transpor-
tation-infrastructure user fees. At least one lower court decision
lends credence to this approach.""5
Unfortunately for Clairoid, many good reasons counsel against
judicial recognition of this limitation on the anti-discrimination rule.
First, if the state genuinely wishes to subsidize in-state farmers, it
can do so through the front door, rather than the back. Indeed, by
forcing states to subsidize in-state industry (if at all) through outright
cash payments (as opposed to user-fee exemptions), courts properly
implement commerce clause values by heightening the visibility
of-and resulting political checks upon-state favoritism of local
enterprises.18 7
186. The case is Salorio v. Glaser, 414 A.2d 943 (N.J. 1980), in which the court applied the
Privileges and Immunities Clause to a New Jersey 'Emergency Transportation Taxe' (ETT')
that-due to exemptions afforded to New Jersey commuters resulting from their obligation to
pay New York income tax-was paid only by New Yorkers who commuted to work in New
Jersey. The court concluded that notwithstanding these New Yorkers' receipt of a credit against
their own otherwise-owing New York income tax for ETT payments, the ETT was a
"discriminatory taie' subject to "close scrutiny" under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Id.
at 953. The court, however, also indicated that the tax should be sustained so long as the tax
"burden on New York commuters [was] substantially commensurate with the benefit they
derive[d] from their use of New Jersey's transportation facilities." Id at 954-55. This passage
and others like it could be read to mean that "it is permissible to require nonresidents to pay up
to 100% of the pro rata expenditures regardless of what percentage of their pro rata share
residents are in fact paying." Carlson, 798 P.2d at 1277-78.
For at least three reasons, however, Salorio's apparent vindication of discriminatory fees
must be taken with a grain of salt. First, in a more recent case, which involved residence-based
discrimination in fixing charges for commercial fishing licenses, the Supreme Court of Alaska
specifically rejected this aspect of the Salorio case. As stated by the Alaska Supreme Court:
[Salorio] seems to add up to the general proposition that a state may subsidize its own
residents in the pursuit of their business activities and not similarly situated
nonresidents, even though this results in substantial inequality of treatment. Such a
principle seems economically indistinguishable from imposing a facially equal tax on
residents and nonresidents while making it effectively unequal by a system of credits
and exemptions. Such schemes have been struck down by the United States Supreme
Court.
Id. at 1278.
Second, in evaluating Salorio, it may be important that the taxing schemes of New York and
New Jersey, in their overall operation, effected no discrimination at all. Perhaps Salorio's
validation of a "discriminatory taxi' measured by benefits imposed on nonresidents was--or in
the future will be-limited to these distinctive circumstances.
Finally, Salorio concerned only the Privileges and Immunities Clause. To be sure, the court
in Carlson suggested that "it is difficult to believe that a license fee differential which passes
muster under the privileges and immunities analysis would nonetheless be an unconstitutional
discrimination against interstate commerce." Id. at 1341 n.1. In fact, however, the Court has
recognized that the Privilege and Immunities and Commerce Clauses are not coextensive. See
note 57. Salorio is thus of questionable doctrinal relevance to the dormant commerce clause
questions addressed in this Article.
187. See, for example, Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 480-81 (cited in note 13). This is not to
say that a state may never subsidize local commerce by way of user-fee reductions or waivers.
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Second, discrimination in fixing transportation-corridor user
fees threatens important purposes of the Commerce Clause even if the
state does not charge cost-exporting monopoly prices. For example,
the imposition of discriminatory road user fees might well engender
retaliatory measures from neighboring states.'88 And discrimination
of itself-particularly in the area of interstate mobility-may send a
signal of hostility to the notion of union that rests at the core of the
dormant Commerce Clause. 18 9
Third, courts should reject Clairoid's fair-fee-and-subsidy ap-
proach because of difficulties in its application. How can we tell if the
fee charged to outsiders really is fair? What evidence should count in
making this decision? And does the relevant evidence in the particu-
lar case, which invariably will be extensive and technical, sufficiently
support the state's position? These questions reveal that application
of Clairoid's proposed rule would both engender administrative head-
aches and invite states to try to "sneak by" fee structures that, despite
state protestations to the contrary, do export costs. The best way to
ensure that interstate commerce is not impeded by cost-exporting
user fees is to impose a wholesale ban on discriminatory fee-setting.
Such a rule will protect out-of-staters by tying their fates directly to
those of in-staters, whose political muscle should typically ensure that
states avoid exacting excessive prices for the use of transportation
infrastructure. 19
Most important of all, Clairoid's position cannot prevail be-
cause the Supreme Court already has rejected it by repeatedly insist-
ing that transportation-related user fees must be both
See Walter Hellerstein and Dan Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business
Development Incentives, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 789, 866-68 (1996) C'[Tihe fixing of user fees
for... non-transportation-related benefits ordinarily should escape Commerce Clause challenge
under the protective umbrella of the market-participant principle."). It is to say, however, that
the heightened risks to interstate commerce posed by discriminatory transportation-
infrastructure user fees may well justify judicial insistence on outright subsidization in the
specialized transportation context.
188. See, for example, H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 532 (noting that "rivalries and repri-
sals.., were meant to be averted by subjecting commerce between the states to the power of
the nation"). See also Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 434 (cited in note 13) (suggesting that risk of
retaliation is lessened when state adopts resident-favoring spending measures).
189. See notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
190. See Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ('[There is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable
government than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a
minority must be imposed generally"). See generally Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 6-5
at 411-12 (cited in note 13).
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"nondiscriminatory" and "reasonable."19, Indeed, in Guy,19 Chief
Justice Waite advocated precisely the position taken by our hypo-
thetical state. Just like Clairoid, he urged that the state should be
able to forego "making any... charge for landing and depositing the
products of the State" at its wharf, so long as carriers of out-of-state
products were charged nothing more than "reasonable compensa-
tion."193 Chief Justice Waite, however, found himself writing in dis-
sent. The possible "reasonableness" of the wharfage fee did not mat-
ter to the majority; the fee's discriminatory character, without more,
rendered it unconstitutional. 194
6. Summary
In sum, considerations of authority, history, and policy support
recognition of a potent constitutional interest in keeping open the
channels of interstate commerce. From this premise it follows that
fees charged for "the buyer's enjoyment of the privilege of using [state]
roads"-as well as other publicly owned corridors of trade-must be
free of "discrimination against interstate commerce." 95  This
principle, however, does not require states to avoid discrimination in
pricing such articles as resort reservations, bottles of mineral water,
or bags of cement.196  It is for this reason that-despite their
ostensible incompatibility'97-the Court's "states can discriminate"
market-participant decisions and its "states cannot discriminate"
user-fee decisions are reconcilable.198
191. See notes 121-33 and accompanying text.
192. 100 U.S. 434 (1879).
193. Id. at 444 (Waite, C.J., dissenting).
194. See notes 111-17 and accompanying text (discussing Guy).
195. Jefferson Lines, 115 S. Ct. at 1345. See also id. at 1349 (1995) (Breyer, J. dissenting)
(noting that "interstate travel itself [is] the very essence of interstate commerce").
196. See notes 96-97, 100 and accompanying text.
197. See notes 24, 30-32 and accompanying text.
198. A case that illustrates the potential dangers of missing this distinction is Western Oil
and Gas Ass'n, 726 F.2d at 1343. There, the Ninth Circuit found that the Court's "user fee"
jurisprudence-including its bar on disproportionality of the fee to the benefit conferred-should
apply to "rents" charged by the state to use lands across which firms had installed petroleum
pipelines. The court was wrong in its reasoning to the extent that it broadly suggested that the
Coures "user fee" authorities controlled simply because these rents constituted "'a specific
charge imposed by the State for the use of state-owned... facilities."' Id. at 1344 (quoting
Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 621). Rather, the "user fee" authorities were dispositive
because the state was exercising "control over the channels of interstate commerce" Id. at 1343
(emphasis added). It was this fact-together with the state's practical "monopoly" over potential
pathways of petroleum traffic, see Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 441-42 & nn.285, 335 (cited in
note 13)-that properly justified the Coures refusal to apply the market-participant exception in
the case.
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This channels-of-commerce harmonization of the Court's user-
fee and market-participant cases also reveals that Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Oregon Waste Systems was both wrong and
right.199 The synthesis shows that the Chief Justice was wrong in his
reading of the majority opinion, by underscoring that the opinion
(which did not concern a state charge for use of wharves, roads, or
airports) was not intended (as the Chief Justice's dissent suggested)
to address the status of discriminatory public-landfill charges under
the Court's past "user fee" decisions.2 00 The synthesis also shows,
however, that Chief Justice Rehnquist was correct in suggesting that
the Court's past user-fee decisions do not bar state discrimination in
fixing charges for public landfill use.201  Hard questions will arise
about the proper scope of a principle that requires open and equal
access to the corridors through which people and property move. 20 2 It
should at least be clear, however, that the principle is inapplicable
when the case concerns nothing more than fees charged for the state-
supplied service of placing trash in the ground.
C. Merging the Market-Participant and User-Fee Principles
1. Constitutional Limits on Discriminatory "User Fees" Outside the
Channels-of-Commerce Context
All that precedes teaches that the Court's past user-fee deci-
sions outlaw only discriminatory charges imposed for use of the ave-
nues of interstate trade. To say this, however, is not to say that every
other charge that the state calls a user fee should escape dormant
commerce clause scrutiny. This is so for two reasons.
First, the market-participant exception itself is subject to lim-
its that cut across cases involving state charges for the use of state
199. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing Oregon Waste Systems dissent).
200. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
201. See notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
202. See, for example, Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 450-53 (cited in note 13) (examining
whether the "channels-of-commerce" principle, or one like it, restricts a state's ability to
discriminate in affording access to state-owned farmers market or other "exchange" facility);
Collins, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 89 n.270 (cited in note 13) (arguing that principle applicable to
"goods or passengers in transit also logically should apply "to communications enterprises that
are location.specific"). See also Transport Limousine of Long Island, Inc. v. Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey, 571 F. Supp. 596 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding 8%-of-revenues charge by
government for right to operate a limousine counter at airport constitutional under either the
market-participant exception or Evansville analysis).
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resources. When a product falls within the "natural resources excep-
tion" to the market-participant principle, for example, the state
should not be able to disfavor nonresidents when setting prices for
that resource any more than the state can prohibit nonresidents from
purchasing it altogether.203 Similarly, the Court has suggested that,
notwithstanding the market-participant principle, the dormant
Commerce Clause limits a state's power to condition sales of its own
goods and services on the buyer's agreement to deal only with private
in-state commercial interests.20 4 To the extent this restriction on so-
called "downstream restraints" is operative, it should outlaw the
conditioning of price breaks on a buyer's agreement to deal only with
resident businesses. 20 5 In short, any natural-resources, downstream-
restraint or other limitation on the market-participant exception
should come into play in cases that involve discriminatory user fees,
including cases outside the transportation context.20 6
The second difficulty with triggering the market-participant
principle whenever the state cries "User Fee!" is illustrated by Oregon
Waste Systems. Although Oregon described its waste surcharge as a
"user fee,"20 7 the Court rejected this characterization "[b]ecause... the
landfills in question [were] owned by private entities... ."208 For Chief
Justice Rehnquist, however, the "user fee" shoe seemed to fit. For him,
even though the state did not own the landfills involved in the case in
the technical sense, prospective landfill space was "a good publicly
produced and owned" as a result of state programs aimed at land
conservation and environmental protection.20 9 Viewed through this
lens, the surcharge was a user fee in the sense that it constituted a
charge for use of land that, through state effort and investment,
remained available to hold buried garbage.
203. See Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 453-60 (cited in note 13) (discussing natural-resource
exception to the market-participant rule). Indeed, a natural resources exception may expose
some (although probably not most) discriminatory waste disposal charges to invalidation under
the dormant Commerce Clause. Id. at 460-62.
204. See id. at 463-73 (discussing downstream-restraints exception).
205. For example, in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82
(1984), a four-justice plurality invalidated Alaska's conditioning of its sale of state-owned timber
on the buyer's agreement to process the timber in the state. Under the principle stated here, it
would not alter the result in South-Central Timber if Alaska conditioned a price reduc-
tion-rather than the sale itself--on the buyer's agreement to the in-state processing term.
206. See New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 275 (suggesting that it makes no difference for
purposes of commerce clause analysis that discrimination puts an "out-of-state product.., at a
substantial commercial disadvantage" instead of mandating "total elimination of all transport of
the subject product").
207. See note 35 and accompanying text.
208. Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 103 n.6.
209. Id. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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The basic problem with Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument is
that it relies on such a strained and abstract concept of state-owned
property as to render the concept infinitely expandable. In fact, a
private corporation developed, owned, and operated the landfill site
involved in Oregon Waste Systems; the state did not. To advance the
argument in these circumstances that the waste disposer nonetheless
was using up "a good publicly produced and owned" (a good that, in
the Chief Justice's view, apparently included all cubic feet of
undeveloped land in the state not yet containing trash) is too exotic to
tolerate.210
Another problem with Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument is
that it tears down the long-recognized distinction between user fees
and taxes. In a loose sense, all taxes are "user fees." Taxpayers pay
taxes, after all, to receive in return such benefits as police protection,
fire protection, and the many other services that state employees,
using state property, supply.211 Yet if all taxes were characterized as
payments for state goods and services, the market-participant excep-
tion to the dormant Commerce Clause would swallow up the entire
corpus of commerce clause cases that have restricted state taxing
powers for well more than a century.212
The essence of a tax is that its payment is made involuntarily
to fund in a general way the state's many services. A user fee, in con-
trast, is paid voluntarily for a focused state benefit as part of a dis-
crete exchange.213 In Oregon Waste Systems no focused, state-provided
210. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, 504 U.S. at 366 & n.7 (emphasizing that "private
landfills... are neither publicly produced nor publicly owned" and that the "public good" analy-
sis applicable to groundwater that a state has acted to conserve is not "even arguably relevant'
to a private landfill case). Compare Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Alabama Solid Waste
Disposal Authority, 814 F. Supp. 1566, 1575 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (rejecting city's argument that it
could hoard solid waste by" 'vesting title'" in the waste in itself by ordinance because the Court
had previously "condemned anticipated efforts" to manipulate the market-participant rule in
this way).
211. Collins, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 79 (cited in note 13) ('Taxes collected pay for governmen-
tal services...."), Shaviro, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 909 (cited in note 101) (describing taxes as an
"imperfect substitute for user fees, made necessary by the public goods problem").
212. See notes 10-11, 62-63, 75-79 and accompanying text.
213. See Samuelson and Nordhaus, Economics at 49 (cited in note 168) (I need not buy a
hamburger or a wool sweater, but I must pay my share of the taxes used to finance defense,
police, and public education."); Shaviro, 90 Mich. L. Rev. at 904 (cited in note 101)
(distinguishing taxes from user fees, described as "market-style exchanges of value for specific
goods or services"). See also notes 84-87 and accompanying text. Notably, the distinction
between user fees and taxes is relevant in a wide variety of legal settings. For example, courts
have had to determine whether charges by federal agencies are authorized fees for benefits
granted, see 31 U.S.C. § 9701(b) (1994 ed.) (authorizing agencies to fix charges for "a service or
thing of value), or are in substance taxes that can be imposed only by Congress itself, see
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quid pro quo was offered in return for payment of Oregon's waste
surcharge. Rather, the benefits received from the state by the sur-
charge-paying waste disposer were the ability to operate against the
backdrop of Oregon's laws, to transport its garbage safely through the
state, and then to deal with a landfill business that was subject, like
other local businesses, to suitable forms of state regulation. In short,
the state's effort to call its surcharge a user fee did not alter the es-
sential reality that the surcharge was a tax.
So it will be in many cases. Indeed, once it is seen that the
principal impact of the "user fee" characterization (outside the chan-
nels-of-commerce context) is to trigger application of the state-protec-
tive market-participant principle, it should become unnecessary even
to ask in dormant commerce clause cases whether the "user fee" label
fits. Instead the relevant "single inquiry" is whether "the challenged
'program constituted direct state participation in the market.' "214 In
many cases, answering this inquiry will be easy. In harder cases,
courts should look to the analytical considerations discernible in the
Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) ('[W]e are to
construe the [Independent Offices Appropriation] Act to cover only 'fees' and not 'taxes.'"
(citations omitted)); National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-43
(1974) (finding charge for permit a fee). Courts have also had to determine whether levies are
taxes subject to priority in bankruptcy proceedings or are fees not entitled to such priority. See
In re Jenny Lynn Mining Co., 780 F.2d 585, 588-89 (6th Cir. 1986) (classifying surcharge as non-
tax fee); In re Lorber Industries of California, Inc., 675 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1982). Whether a
charge is characterized as a user fee or as a tax determines its susceptibility to attack under the
Export Clause, U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 5. Compare Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372 (1876)
(finding no constitutional violation because a tobacco stamp charge constitutes fee for regulatory
service) with United States Shoe Corp. v. United States, 907 F. Supp. 408 (Ct. Inel Trade 1995)
(harbor-maintenance charge fails because it is a tax). The resolution of this question is also of
significance in determining the applicability of the intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine.
See, for example, Massachusetts, 435 U.S. at 453-70. Some cases raise the question whether
exactions are taxes subject to state constitutional requirements of uniformity and equality or
are fees not subject to such requirements. See Newman v. City of Indianola, 232 N.W.2d 568
(Iowa 1975) (holding that special assessment for local improvement does not constitute tax);
Wetzel County Solid Waste Authority v. West Virginia Division of Natural Resources, 462 S.E.2d
349 (W. Va. 1995) (holding that solid waste assessment charge is regulatory fee rather than tax);
City of Fairmont v. Pitrolo Pontiac-Cadillac Co., 308 S.Ed.2d 527 (W. Va. 1983) (holding that
"fire service fee" constitutes ad valorem property tax). In a recent decision, the Idaho Supreme
Court found the user-fee/tax characterization issue dispositive in deciding whether a charge
imposed on petroleum distributors had to go into the state's Clean Water Trust Fund or be
dedicated to highway purposes. V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho Petroleum Clean Water Trust Fund, 1996
WL 364793 at *2-3 (Idaho July 2, 1996). Whether a charge is characterized as a "fee" or a "tae'
may even have consequences in applying the "nexus" prong of the Complete Auto Transit
dormant commerce clause test. See Ferndale Laboratories, 79 F.3d at 493-94; Department of
Banking & Finance, State of Florida v. Credicorp, Inc., 684 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1996). See notes 62-
63 and accompanying text (setting forth Complete Auto Transit standard). The proper
characterization of governmental charges as taxes or user fees in these contexts is beyond the
scope of this Article.
214. White, 460 U.S. at 208 (quoting Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436).
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Court's past decisions for determining whether the market-
participant description applies.1 5
The state, for example, clearly is participating in the market
when it fixes a "user fee" for a discrete state-made product, such as a
bag of cement.216 The state is not a market participant, however,
when it purports to impose a "user fee" for granting the bare right to
engage in a regulated commercial activity. Courts, for example,
should not permit a state to discriminate between residents and non-
residents in fixing a fee for a building-contractor license. In such a
case the state, in a loose sense, is transferring "property."217 The mere
issuance of a license, however, does not bring into play the central
policy concerns that underlie the market-participant principle: 218 It
does not embody a "return of capital" supplied by state citizens as
taxpayers to a favored subgroup;29 it does not reflect the sort of
experimental use of state resources our federal system is designed to
encourage; 20 it does not involve the sort of inherently costly activity
that provides a built-in check on excessive resident-favoring state
action;2 1 and it does not concern state behavior even remotely akin to
that typically engaged in by a private trader.2 22 In short, imposition of
a business-license charge-whether or not denominated by the state
as a "user fee"-does not involve market participation. Thus, the
dormant commerce clause anti-discrimination principle should
remain applicable to, and invalidate, a residence-based license fee
differential.223
215. See, for example, Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 441-43 (cited in note 13) (outlining a
four.part framework for evaluating market-participant issues); Benjamin C. Bair, Note, The
Dormant Commerce Clause and State-Mandated Preference Laws in Public Contracting:
Developing a More Substantive Application of the Market-Participant Exception, 93 Mich. L.
Rev. 2408, 2419-25 (1995) (discussing exception's underlying rationales).
216. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 440.
217. See, for example, Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (deeming horse trainer
license a "clear property interese' for purposes of fourteenth amendment procedural due process
protection).
218. See Coenen, 88 Mich. L. Rev. at 419-41 (cited in note 13).
219. See id. at 421-26.
220. See id. at 426-30.
221. See id. at 430-35.
222. See id. at 435-38.
223. Accord, Chance Management Inc. v. State of South Dakota, 97 F.3d. 1107, 1120 (8th
Cir. 1996) (Lay, J., dissenting) (stating that "granting and denial of public licenses clearly
constitutes market regulation outside the market participant exception," citing Richard A.
Epstein, The Permit Power Meets the Constitution, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 407 (1995)). See Welton v.
Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1875) (striking down peddler license fee that exempted peddlers of
in-state goods). See also Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375, 380 (1939) (striking down
inspection fee, which greatly exceeded cost of inspection, imposed only on importers of cement).
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2. A Proposed Step-by-Step Approach
The foregoing discussion suggests that "user fee" cases should
trigger a logical chain of judicial inquiry. First, the court should ask
whether the challenged charge involves the levying of a tax or the
state's participation in the market. In general, the latter label will fit
when the state imposes a fee for the use or receipt of specific state-
owned property or the delivery of a discrete service provided by state-
paid personnel.224 Second, if the charge is a tax, the court should-as
in Commonwealth Edison225-apply the four-part Complete Auto
Transit test.226 If the charge is not a tax, the court should deem the
market-participant exception presumptively applicable and then
inquire whether any exception to that exception is operative.227 At
this stage of the inquiry, attention should focus on whether the state
has discriminated in affording access to the infrastructure of inter-
state trade. If this limitation on the market-participant exception is
triggered, the court should assess the fee under the distinctive "user
fee" jurisprudence typified by cases like Evansville-Vanderburgh
Airport Authority228 and Northwest Airlines,29 including by applying
their ban on discriminatory charges. 230 If this limitation on the
See generally United States Shoe Corp., 907 F. Supp. at 413 (finding that alleged user fee
constitutes tax for purposes of Export Clause because "court looks to substance over
nomenclature").
224. See notes 19-21, 213 and accompanying text.
225. See notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
226. See note 63 and accompanying text.
227. See notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
228. See notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
229. See note 139 and accompanying text.
230. See notes 28, 131-32, 137-39 and accompanying text. Application of the
nondiscrimination principle will in turn raise the question of whether and when that principle,
even if applicable, admits of exceptions. See, for example, Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at
101 n.5 ('Of course, if out-of-state waste did impose higher costs on Oregon than in-state waste,
Oregon could recover the increased cost through a differential charge on out-of-state
waste .. "). Notably, in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399 (1948), and Mullaney v. Anderson,
342 U.S. 415, 417 (1952), the Court struck down under the Privileges and Immunities Clause
commercial fishing license fees imposed on nonresidents that greatly exceeded fees imposed on
residents. In doing so, however, the Court observed that "[t]he state is not without power ... to
charge non-residents a differential which would merely compensate the State for any added
enforcement burden they may impose or for any conservation expenditures from taxes which
only residents pay." Toomer, 334 U.S. at 398-99. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 405 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-35 at 538 (cited in note 13) ('Montana could
constitutionally charge nonresidents more for elk hunting privileges to the extent that their
presence imposed added costs on the state or to the extent that residents, through taxes other
than license fees, contributed more to the state's wildlife management program."). These broad
suggestions in privileges and immunities clause cases that the Court might sustain
discriminatory fees "to compensate for ... taxes which only residents pay," however, seem
inapplicable for dormant commerce clause purposes in light of the Courts recent-and
strict---"compensatory tax doctrine" decisions. See, for example, Fulton Corp., 116 S. Ct. at 852-
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market-participant exception is not triggered, the court should
consider whether the natural-resources or downstream-restraint or
another limitation is applicable. If no exception to the market-
participant principle applies, the court should find the fee
constitutional.21
Working through this process in concrete cases will raise inevi-
table difficulties.22  Adopting this general methodology, however, will
solve the overarching problem pointed up by Oregon Waste Systems:
It will reconcile the Supreme Court's dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence in the state-taxation, market-participant, and user-fee
fields.
53. Indeed, the Court appeared to reject precisely this "expansive loophole" to its "carefully
confined compensatory tax jurisprudence" in the Oregon Waste Systems decision. Oregon Waste
Systems, 511 U.S. at 105 n.8.
231. Of course, the market-participant exception itself has drawn significant criticism, and
recent commentaries have called for its repudiation, particularly in light of the Court's decision
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). For a critique of
this attack on the market-participant rule, see Dan T. Coenen, The Impact of the Garcia
Decision on the Market-Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1995 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 727.
232. For example, this Article does not specifically consider the proper treatment of what
might be described as "administrative" or "regulatory" fees--that is, fees charged not for use of
tangible property (for example, a campsite) or some government-provided service otherwise
available in the private market (for example, education), but instead for the cost of administer-
ing a focused, but quintessentially governmental, regulatory program (for example, a govern-
ment charge imposed on private aviators for policing private aviation). It at least seems logical,
however, to say that regulatory fees associated with interstate transportation should be no less
subject to dormant commerce clause scrutiny than fees charged for the use of tangible physical
improvements, actually owned by the state, in the form of roads. The latter, after all, would
seem to present a more appealing (though ultimately unsuccessful) case for application of the
market-participant exception. Beyond this, the proper characterization and treatment of
administrative fees will be left behind for others to analyze, save for the observation that courts
often seem to treat such charges merely as a subspecies of user fees. See Massachusetts, 435
U.S. at 463 n.19 ('Quite simply, we think there is no basis for the position that user fees are
constitutional only when the [government] has some sort of a right of property. A user-fee
rationale may be invoked whenever the [government] is recovering a fair approximation of the
cost of benefits supplied."); Center for Auto Safety, 37 F.3d at 143-44 (rejecting an argument that
"user fee" label fits only "when a state seeks to recoup the costs of operating a specific state
facility or of providing specific quantifiable services" and characterizing charge imposed on
solicitation-by-mail charities as user fee because such charities "use the state's apparatus for
regulating charities" whereby "donor confidence is enhanced"). See also New Hampshire Motor
Transport Ass'n v. Flynn, 751 F.2d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 1984) C([The Commerce Clause does not
prevent states from charging for services they provide.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
"The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antithe-
ses, the synthesis of opposites, these are the great problems of the
law."233 This Article has sought to untangle the seemingly contradic-
tory pronouncements of the Supreme Court in its dormant commerce
clause user-fee and market-participant decisions. The synthesis
offered here draws upon the principle that "general expressions, in
every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which
those expressions are used."234 This maxim should guide application
of the Court's decisions that broadly proclaim that state user fees may
not discriminate against interstate commerce, for each of those deci-
sions in actuality involved a distinctive form of state-owned property:
A corridor through which interstate commerce moves. Courts should
continue to apply a strong anti-discrimination principle in this class of
user-fee cases. Courts should not, however, extend this principle
further.
This refinement of the Court's user-fee anti-discrimination rule
will serve two important purposes. First, it will vindicate the particu-
larly potent policies at work when states threaten to impede access to
the essential infrastructure of interstate trade. Second, it will supply
a much-needed reconciliation of the Supreme Court's deeply discor-
dant market-participant and user-fee decisions.
233. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science 4 (Columbia U., 1928).
234. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399 (1821).
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